Reforming Global Governance: Power, Alliance, and Institutional Performance

Abstract

abstract:A large literature analyzes the determinants of change in international institutions, focusing on the role of systemic political and economic shocks. However, this article considers this question also in more business-as-usual periods, asking when institutions of global governance reform and which states benefit from these changes. The authors argue that allies of international organizations (io)s' leading stakeholders benefit more than nonaligned countries; however, the authors also document that reforms sometimes contain concessions to nonallied members. This article theorizes that while io officials reward major stakeholders' allies in normal times, they provide concessions to nonallies during periods of poor io performance to prevent these states from disengaging. Analyzing an original data set of reforms at the World Bank between 1944 and 2018, paired with qualitative evidence, the article finds significant support for its hypotheses. The findings help to make sense of otherwise puzzling instances of power shifts within ios.