Does Monetary Policy Credibility Help in Anchoring Inflation Expectations? Evidence from Six Inflation Targeting Emerging Economies

Abstract

Abstract Most emerging market central banks have adopted inflation targeting as their monetary policy system. The heart of inflation targeting system is inflation expectations. The success of a central bank in achieving targets depends on to the extent to which inflation expectations are formed by the announced targets. As the credibility of the central bank increases, its ability to affect the public expectation also increases. The public adjusts its inflation expectations based on announced inflation target only in case of that they believe that the central bank has the sufficiency to reach the inflation target. Credibility enables expectation to be formed in a forward-looking way by weakening its connection with the past. This study aims to contribute to the literature concerning the effects of credibility on monetary policy. For this purpose, using data of six emerging inflation targeting economies (Turkey, Brazil, the Czech Republic, Chile, Poland, and South Africa), the empirical tests were carried out in order to understand the effect of the credibility on the behaviour of inflation expectation in emerging economies. The findings denote that credibility is quite relevant to reduce inflation expectations and contributes to the strength of inflation targets being an anchor for inflation expectations.