The Principle of the Separation of Powers: the Ontological Presumption of an Ideologeme

Abstract

Abstract The theoretical materiality of the principle of the separation of powers is beyond doubt. This principle is inevitable in discourse on the constitutional framework of the state, democracy and the rule of law, and it has its own form of expression in positive law. Although the relevance of the principle of the separation of powers in social discourse creates the illusion of the conceivability of its content, the ontological questions concerning this principle remain largely vague. This can be explained by considering two aspects. First, as established in scientific doctrines and constitutional forms of expression, the principle of the separation of powers has become a social and legal ideologeme; it approximates an axiom which is no longer substantiated anew. Second, discourse concerning ontology is always complicated, since it calls to question the essence itself. It is complicated not only because it requires a particular intellectual effort and academic courage, but also because the outcome of such discourse is unpredictable and can lead either to the ideologeme being confirmed to be true or being unexpectedly revised, or perhaps can even lead to the demise of what has so far been self-evident, unquestionable, obvious, universally known, etc. This article analyses the ontological essence of the principle of the separation of powers – an approach towards the human being, whereby meaning is given to the consequent system of causal relationships within the whole theory. Discourse in this article takes ontological issues as its object of inquiry: why did we decide to separate powers and how many of these separated powers are there?