{"title":"A neglected interpretation of Avicenna’s theory of God’s knowledge of particulars","authors":"Amirhossein Zadyousefi","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2022.2004494","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT It seems Avicenna’s passages regarding God’s knowledge of particulars are susceptible of being given two different types of interpretation. The main difference between these two accounts of his theory concerning God’s knowledge of particulars is that one of them, which I call the Neglected Interpretation, appeals to some metaphysical entities as the proxies of concrete particular objects, which are distinct from God’s essence, to explain God’s knowledge of particulars, while the other type does not. The views of post-Avicennian thinkers like Suhrawardī and Ṭūsī of Avicenna’s account are classifiable under the Neglected Interpretation, as shown by their objections to Avicenna’s theory of God’s knowledge of particulars. This type of interpretation of Avicenna’s theory of God’s knowledge of particulars has been neglected in the secondary English literature on the issue. In this paper, I will present a reconstructed version of this type of interpretation of the Avicennian theory of divine knowledge.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"32 1","pages":"201 - 214"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5000,"publicationDate":"2022-01-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2022.2004494","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"ASIAN STUDIES","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Abstract
ABSTRACT It seems Avicenna’s passages regarding God’s knowledge of particulars are susceptible of being given two different types of interpretation. The main difference between these two accounts of his theory concerning God’s knowledge of particulars is that one of them, which I call the Neglected Interpretation, appeals to some metaphysical entities as the proxies of concrete particular objects, which are distinct from God’s essence, to explain God’s knowledge of particulars, while the other type does not. The views of post-Avicennian thinkers like Suhrawardī and Ṭūsī of Avicenna’s account are classifiable under the Neglected Interpretation, as shown by their objections to Avicenna’s theory of God’s knowledge of particulars. This type of interpretation of Avicenna’s theory of God’s knowledge of particulars has been neglected in the secondary English literature on the issue. In this paper, I will present a reconstructed version of this type of interpretation of the Avicennian theory of divine knowledge.
期刊介绍:
Asian Philosophy is an international journal concerned with such philosophical traditions as Indian, Chinese, Japanese, Buddhist and Islamic. The purpose of the journal is to bring these rich and varied traditions to a worldwide academic audience. It publishes articles in the central philosophical areas of metaphysics, philosophy of mind, epistemology, logic, moral and social philosophy, as well as in applied philosophical areas such as aesthetics and jurisprudence. It also publishes articles comparing Eastern and Western philosophical traditions.