Exekutive Normsetzung in der Corona-Pandemie – ein krisenverwaltungs- und krisenverfassungsrechtlicher Vergleich zwischen Deutschland und Italien

Abstract

Many countries made extensive use of executive instruments to contain the Corona virus. This article will examine a tension in Corona-related lawmaking: on the one hand, there is the need for executive lawmaking for a quick and accurate crisis-response, while on the other hand, parliament should have general control of lawmaking, taking into account the reservation of a statutory provision, the principle of legal certainty, and the separation of powers. The study will be conducted from a comparative law perspective, looking at Germany and Italy. It will show that the use of executive legislative instruments in the pandemic in Germany and Italy has not only posed new problems for constitutional law, but has also made existing ones more visible and given rise to fundamental criticism, both by legal scholars and the courts. However, this did not lead to a paradigm shift in constitutional law, but, at best, triggered a development of the law, in particular the operationalisation and strengthening of constitutional principles such as the reservation of a statutory provision and the principle of legal certainty. © 2022 Duncker und Humblot GmbH. All rights reserved.