Large bank shareholders and terms of bank loans during the global financial crisis

IF 9.4 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Celia Álvarez-Botas, Carlos Fernández-Méndez, Víctor M. González
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引用次数: 6

Abstract

This paper analyzes the influence of large bank shareholders on the terms of bank loans for a sample of 12,045 loans to 3,290 borrowers from 45 countries over the period 2004–2013. We investigate the effects of bank control over bank loan terms during the global financial crisis, regardless of whether the bank shareholder is a lender or not. In line with a monitoring effect, the results suggest that firms with bank shareholders that are non-lenders borrowed at lower interest rates and longer maturities during the period of crisis. However, borrowers paid higher spreads and were offered shorter maturities when they borrowed from banks that are also shareholders. This effect is consistent with banks obtaining private benefits as large shareholders as a consequence of the informational hold-up problems affecting borrowers.

在全球金融危机期间,大银行股东和银行贷款条款
本文分析了2004年至2013年期间,来自45个国家的3290名借款人获得的12045笔贷款中,大型银行股东对银行贷款条款的影响。我们调查了全球金融危机期间银行对银行贷款条款的控制的影响,无论银行股东是否为贷款人。与监测效果一致,研究结果表明,在危机期间,拥有非贷款人银行股东的公司以较低的利率和较长的期限借款。然而,当借款人从同时也是股东的银行借款时,他们支付了更高的息差,并获得了更短的到期日。这种影响与银行作为大股东因影响借款人的信息滞留问题而获得私人利益是一致的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
9.10
自引率
2.00%
发文量
23
期刊介绍: The Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting publishes original research dealing with international aspects of financial management and reporting, banking and financial services, auditing and taxation. Providing a forum for the interaction of ideas from both academics and practitioners, the JIFMA keeps you up-to-date with new developments and emerging trends.
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