“Here (...) Practical Anthropology becomes pure art”: Kant on the distinction between Empirical Psychology and Pragmatic Anthropology

IF 0.1 4区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
F. Silva
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Among the many stages of Kant’s problem of a reciprocal collocation of the human knowledges, Encyclopedism, quite unsurprisingly, is one of the most relevant; and yet, quite surprisingly, it is Anthropology which plays here one of the lead parts, insofar as the complex ascertainment of its definition, its position, its task proves to be of irrefutable importance towards solving the greater problem at hand. The question arises as the association – or dissociation – between Empirical Psychology and Pragmatic Anthropology, and their inclusion in, or exclusion from, their greater or lesser relation with Metaphysics; a problem which, to the careless eye, seems to have been promoted by Kant himself. Here, opinions diverge as to the nature of the relation between the two sciences, from their total inter-dependence to their complete separation. We, in turn, propose a different approach. Our objective is to reenact Kant’s fundamental scheme of human knowledges, as presented not only in the only extant Lecture on Encyclopedism, but in various others dimensions of Kant’s academic activity; and here, to propose a contrasting analysis between Empirical Psychology and Pragmatic Anthropology; one, however, based not on the assumption of their consonance or dissonance through their characteristics, rather on their respective position and scope amid the field of human knowledges. As such, it is our intention to consider Kant’s Lectures in their interconnection, namely, in their apparently dubious simultaneous collocation of an Empirical Psychology as Anthropology; and, based on their specific position in the scheme of human knowledges, and what this position entails in terms of their scope and task, to ascertain to what extent Empirical Psychology is indeed Anthropology, and from what extent Empirical Psychology is no longer Anthropology – not, at least, Pragmatic Anthropology. In other words, we shall labor towards defining a dividing line in Kant’s scheme of human knowledges; one which for Kant represents a third dimension of knowledge and stands between rational and empirical, Metaphysics and the historical sciences; that line, in our view, being that of a cosmopolitical prism. Keywords: Kant, encyclopedism, anthropology, empirical psychology, cosmopolitanism.
“在这里(…)实践人类学成为纯粹的艺术”:康德论经验心理学与实践人类学的区别
在康德关于人类知识的相互搭配问题的许多阶段中,百科全书论无疑是最相关的阶段之一;然而,令人十分惊奇的是,在这里起主导作用的正是人类学,因为对它的定义、它的地位、它的任务的复杂确定,对于解决眼前的更大的问题,证明具有无可辩驳的重要性。问题出现在经验心理学和实用人类学之间的联系或分离,以及它们与形而上学或多或少的关系的包含或排除;这个问题,在粗心的人看来,似乎是康德自己提出来的。在这里,人们对这两门科学之间关系的本质有不同的看法,从它们完全相互依赖到它们完全分离。反过来,我们提出了一种不同的方法。我们的目标是重现康德关于人类知识的基本构想,这不仅体现在现存唯一的《百科全书》讲座中,也体现在康德学术活动的其他各个方面;并在此提出经验心理学与实用人类学的对比分析;然而,一个不是基于他们的特征来假设他们的和谐或不和谐,而是基于他们在人类知识领域中的各自位置和范围。因此,我们的目的在于考察康德的《讲学》的相互联系,即考察它把经验心理学与人类学同时结合起来,这显然是可疑的;并且,根据它们在人类知识体系中的特殊地位,以及这种地位在它们的范围和任务方面所要求的,确定经验心理学在何种程度上确实是人类学,以及在何种程度上经验心理学不再是人类学——至少不是实用人类学。换句话说,我们将努力在康德的人类知识体系中定义一条分界线;在康德看来,它代表着知识的第三维度,介于理性与经验、形而上学与历史科学之间;在我们看来,这条线是世界政治棱镜的线。关键词:康德,百科全书,人类学,经验心理学,世界主义。
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来源期刊
Filosofia Unisinos
Filosofia Unisinos PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
0.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
10
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