Sometimes I Am Fictional: Narrative and Identification

IF 0.5 3区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Alfonso Muñoz-Corcuera
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Abstract Most analytical philosophers consider that we cannot identify with fictional characters in a literal sense. Specifically, Carroll and Gaut argue that doing so would imply a high degree of irrationality. In this paper I stand for the claim that we can identify with fictional characters thanks to a suspension of disbelief. First, I rely on narrative theories of personal identity to propose a model of how the process of identification might happen in real life. Then, I explain how this model can be adapted to account for the suspension of disbelief that occurs in the special case of identification with fictional characters.
有时我是虚构的:叙事与认同
摘要大多数分析哲学家认为,我们不能从字面意义上认同虚构人物。具体来说,Carroll和Gaut认为这样做意味着高度的非理性。在这篇论文中,我支持这样一种说法,即由于暂停了怀疑,我们可以认同虚构人物。首先,我依靠个人身份的叙事理论,提出了一个识别过程如何在现实生活中发生的模型。然后,我解释了如何调整这个模型,以解释在认同虚构人物的特殊情况下出现的怀疑暂停。
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来源期刊
Philosophical Papers
Philosophical Papers PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
2.10
自引率
0.00%
发文量
18
期刊介绍: Philosophical Papers is an international, generalist journal of philosophy edited in South Africa Original Articles: Articles appearing in regular issues are original, high-quality, and stand-alone, and are written for the general professional philosopher. Submissions are welcome in any area of philosophy and undergo a process of peer review based on initial editor screening and refereeing by (usually) two referees. Special Issues: Topic-based special issues are comprised of both invited and submitted papers selected by guest editors. Recent special issues have included ''Philosophy''s Therapeutic Potential'' (2014, editor Dylan Futter); ''Aging and the Elderly'' (2012, editors Tom Martin and Samantha Vice); ''The Problem of the Criterion'' (2011, editor Mark Nelson); ''Retributive Emotions'' (2010, editor Lucy Allais); ‘Rape and its Meaning/s’ (2009, editor Louise du Toit). Calls for papers for upcoming special issues can be found here. Ideas for future special issues are welcome.
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