Medical Intervention and Incapax Patients: The Place of Negotiorum Gestio within Law’s “Fundamental Structural Language”

IF 0.2 Q4 LAW
Jonathan Brown
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Abstract

A. INTRODUCTION In 2017, Professor Martin Hogg published a magisterial monograph on the subject of Obligations: Law and Language. From the outset of that work, the author notes that the words used by the parties to obligational relationships―even obligational relationships which are constituted ex voluntate―do not need to, and indeed do not generally, map on to the “fundamental structural language” of the law. This “fundamental structural language” can be understood as the lexicon comprised of those basic terms which are used by “external observers” of obligational relationships―most often being lawyers, legislators and jurists―to “make sense” of the law of obligations conceptually, as well as of specific undertakings in particular. Words such as ‘promise’, ‘offer’ and ‘unqualified acceptance’, to take some basic examples not directly examined by Hogg for “constraints of space”, might be applied by the parties to a (potentially) obligational relationship. However, the subjective understanding that the parties themselves have of these terms, or their respective intentions in using them, will not necessarily correspond with the objective legal understanding of the relevant words. Within the field of ex lege obligations―that is, those obligations which are imposed by law, or arise juridically―there is less (indeed, usually no) opportunity for the parties to demonstrate their own understanding of the words habitually employed to describe the obligational nexus. It does not matter how a negligent driver who is sued for causing injury to another road user would describe their relationship to the pursuer: the institutional position is that they are delictually liable to repair the damnum [loss] that they wrongfully caused. A party to a frustrated agreement might not think or believe themselves to be ‘unjustifiably enriched’ by possessing something given to them in the expectation of their performance of
医疗干预与失智患者:无因手势在法律“基本结构语言”中的地位
A.引言2017年,Martin Hogg教授出版了一本关于义务:法律与语言的权威专著。从这项工作的一开始,作者就指出,义务关系的当事方使用的词语——甚至是根据自愿构成的义务关系——不需要,事实上,通常也不符合法律的“基本结构语言”。这种“基本结构语言”可以理解为由义务关系的“外部观察者”——通常是律师、立法者和法学家——使用的基本术语组成的词典,以在概念上“理解”义务法,特别是具体承诺的法律。“承诺”、“要约”和“无条件接受”等词语,举一些霍格没有直接审查过的“空间限制”的基本例子,可能会被当事人应用于(潜在的)义务关系。然而,当事人本身对这些术语的主观理解,或他们各自使用这些术语的意图,不一定与对相关词语的客观法律理解相一致。在法外义务领域——即法律规定的或法律上产生的义务——当事方很少(事实上,通常没有)机会表明他们自己理解习惯性地用来描述义务关系的词语。一个因对另一名道路使用者造成伤害而被起诉的疏忽大意的司机会如何描述他们与追捕者的关系并不重要:机构的立场是,他们有责任修复他们错误造成的损失。受挫协议的一方可能不会认为或相信自己通过拥有为履行义务而给予的东西而“不合理地致富”
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.30
自引率
33.30%
发文量
72
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