Are ESG performance-based incentives a panacea or a smokescreen for excess compensation?

IF 5.2 4区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
S. Keddie, M. Magnan
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

Purpose This paper aims to examine how the use of environmental, social and governance (ESG) incentives intersects with top management power and various corporate governance mechanisms to affect excess annual cash bonus compensation. Design/methodology/approach The authors use a novel artificial intelligence (AI) technique to obtain data about ESG incentives use by firms in the S&P 500. The authors test the hypotheses with an endogenous treatment-regression and a contrast test. Findings When the top management team has power and uses ESG incentives, there is a 32% reduction in excess annual cash bonuses implying ESG incentives are an effective corporate governance tool. However, nuanced analyses reveal that when powerful management teams with ESG incentives are from environmentally sensitive industries, have a corporate social responsibility (CSR) committee or have long-term view institutional shareholders, they derive excess bonuses. Practical implications Stakeholders will better understand management’s motivations for the inclusion of ESG incentives in executive compensation contracts and be able to identify situations which require closer scrutiny. Social implications Given the increased popularity of ESG incentives, society, regulators, boards of directors and management teams will be interested in better understanding when these incentives might be effective and when they might be abused. Originality/value To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to examine the use of ESG incentives in relation to excess pay. The authors contribute to both the CSR and executive compensation literatures. The work also uses a new methodological technique using AI to gather difficult-to-obtain data, opening new avenues for research.
ESG绩效激励是万能药还是超额薪酬的烟幕弹?
目的本文旨在研究环境、社会和治理(ESG)激励措施的使用如何与最高管理层权力和各种公司治理机制交叉,从而影响超额年度现金奖金薪酬。设计/方法论/方法作者使用一种新的人工智能(AI)技术来获得标准普尔500指数中公司使用ESG激励的数据。作者用内生治疗回归和对比检验来检验这些假设。发现当最高管理团队拥有权力并使用ESG激励措施时,超额年度现金奖金会减少32%,这意味着ESG激励措施是一种有效的公司治理工具。然而,细致入微的分析表明,当具有ESG激励的强大管理团队来自环境敏感行业、拥有企业社会责任委员会或拥有长期机构股东时,他们会获得超额奖金。实际含义利益相关者将更好地了解管理层将ESG激励纳入高管薪酬合同的动机,并能够确定需要更仔细审查的情况。社会影响鉴于ESG激励措施越来越受欢迎,社会、监管机构、董事会和管理团队将有兴趣更好地了解这些激励措施何时有效以及何时可能被滥用。独创性/价值据作者所知,本研究首次考察了ESG激励措施与超额薪酬的关系。作者对企业社会责任和高管薪酬文献都有贡献。这项工作还使用了一种新的方法论技术,利用人工智能收集难以获得的数据,为研究开辟了新的途径。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
9.50
自引率
6.70%
发文量
38
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