Judicial Power Decentralization in Ethiopia: Practical Limitations and Implications on Self-governance of Regional States

Abstract

Ethiopia’s Constitution provides for a parallel –federal and state– court system. While federal courts entertain cases of federal matter, state courts adjudicate regional matters. However, there are ambiguous issues and practical limitations relating to this judicial power decentralization, some of which have an undesirable implication on the self-governance of regional states. These are the federal versus state matter controversy, the scope of the Federal Judicial Administration Council’s involvement in the nomination of state court judges, lack of standard criteria to calculate the cost regional state courts incur in exercising delegated judicial powers and the issue of cassation over cassation on state matters. Several challenges arise from the distribution of judicial authority in Ethiopia. First, regional states have done little with regard to distinguishing state matters from federal matters, and claiming reimbursement for costs they incur in exercising delegated federal judicial power. Second, the federal Supreme Court allocates nominal compensatory budget without considering the number of federal cases that are adjudicated in state courts and accordingly computing the cost incurred while state courts exercise delegated federal judicial power. Third, cassation over cassation on state matters seems to be inconsistent with the federal arrangement. These factors indicate gaps in the decentralization of judicial power which necessitate constitutional and legislative measures that can rectify these limitations commensurate with the power of regional states to exercise judicial power in regional matters.  Key terms Judicial power, Federalism, Decentralization, Self-governance, Ethiopia