Insider trading regulation and trader migration

IF 2.1 2区经济学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Financial Markets Pub Date : 2023-11-01 DOI:10.1016/j.finmar.2023.100839

Robert Merl , Stefan Palan , Dominik Schmidt , Thomas Stöckl

引用次数: 1

Abstract

Discussions about insider trading regulation veer between the poles of forbidding insider trading to protect market integrity and allowing insider trading to foster informational efficiency. We study traders’ preferences for regulation by offering them concurrent markets with different regulatory regimes in an experimental setting. We find that informed traders’ preference for the unregulated market causes both informed and uninformed traders to be more active in the unregulated market. This market, thus, sees more trading volume, lower spreads, and less mispricing. Nevertheless, uninformed traders suffer greater losses in unregulated markets, while informed traders profit from the absence of regulation.

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内幕交易监管与交易员迁移

关于内幕交易监管的讨论在禁止内幕交易以保护市场诚信和允许内幕交易以促进信息效率之间摇摆。我们通过在实验环境中为交易者提供具有不同监管制度的并行市场来研究他们对监管的偏好。我们发现，知情交易者对不受监管市场的偏好导致知情交易者和不知情交易者在不受监管市场中都更加活跃。因此，这个市场的交易量更大，价差更低，错误定价更少。然而，不知情的交易者在不受监管的市场中遭受更大的损失，而知情的交易者则从缺乏监管中获利。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Journal of Financial Markets BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

3.40

自引率

3.60%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Financial Markets publishes high quality original research on applied and theoretical issues related to securities trading and pricing. Area of coverage includes the analysis and design of trading mechanisms, optimal order placement strategies, the role of information in securities markets, financial intermediation as it relates to securities investments - for example, the structure of brokerage and mutual fund industries, and analyses of short and long run horizon price behaviour. The journal strives to maintain a balance between theoretical and empirical work, and aims to provide prompt and constructive reviews to paper submitters.