Wittgenstein, Peirce, and Death

IF 0.3 3区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

IDEALISTIC STUDIES Pub Date : 2019-08-08 DOI:10.5840/IDSTUDIES20198699

Marco Stango

引用次数: 0

Abstract

The paper presents a Peircean criticism of Wittgenstein’s views on death. By exploring the notion of ‘limit’ central to both Wittgenstein and Peirce, the paper claims that a Peircean pragmatic notion of death can retain the advantages of Wittgenstein’s ‘limit’ notion of death without incurring the shortcomings of the latter, which I identify with semantic and metaphysical externality. I conclude by sketching out some consequences of the Peircean view for a metaphysics of death.

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维特根斯坦，皮尔斯与死亡

本文对维特根斯坦的死亡观提出了一种皮尔式的批判。通过探索维特根斯坦和皮尔斯的核心“极限”概念，本文声称，皮尔斯的实用主义死亡概念可以保留维特根斯坦的“极限”死亡概念的优点，而不会引起后者的缺点，我认为后者是语义和形而上学的外部性。最后，我概述了一些关于死亡形而上学的皮尔斯观点的结果。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

IDEALISTIC STUDIES PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

0.50

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Idealistic Studies provides a peer-reviewed forum for the discussion of themes and topics that relate to the tradition and legacy of philosophical Idealism. Established in 1971 as a vehicle for American Personalism and post-Kantian Idealism, the journal"s purview now includes historically earlier expressions, as well as the inheritance of that past in the developments of late 19th to mid-20th century philosophy. The journal has also become a venue for a number of philosophical movements that share Idealism in their genealogies, including Phenomenology, Neo-Kantianism, Historicism, Hermeneutics, Life Philosophy, Existentialism, and Pragmatism.