BANK EARNINGS MANAGEMENT AND DIVIDEND POLICY UNDER AGENCY PROBLEM CONTEXTS

IF 2 0 ECONOMICS
D. Tran
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Using a large sample of U.S. bank holding companies (BHC) from 2000:Q1–2017:Q4, we investigate the impacts of dividend policy to bank earnings management, and document that banks that pay dividends tend to be less opaque than banks that do not pay dividends. The dividend policy not only impacts the conditional average earnings management of banks, but also exerts influence on their dispersion. The impact of dividend policy appears to be more profound for highly opaque banks. We identify different conditions that motivate different discretionary behaviors of banks, which allows us to better observe different managerial motives between dividend-paying and dividend-non-paying banks. Under high information asymmetry context, there is valuably additional information conveyed by paying dividends, and it follows that the role of dividends as a means of conveying information is more pronounced. For banks subject to high agency problems, paying dividends make them to be less opaque through reducing the discretionary behaviors.
代理问题背景下的银行盈余管理与股利政策
使用2000年第一季度至2017年第四季度的美国银行控股公司(BHC)的大样本,我们调查了股息政策对银行盈余管理的影响,并记录了支付股息的银行往往比不支付股息的公司不透明。股利政策不仅影响银行的条件平均盈余管理,而且影响其分散性。股息政策对高度不透明的银行的影响似乎更为深远。我们确定了激励银行不同自由裁量行为的不同条件,这使我们能够更好地观察派息银行和不派息银行之间不同的管理动机。在高度信息不对称的背景下,支付股息会传递有价值的额外信息,因此股息作为信息传递手段的作用更加明显。对于面临高度代理问题的银行来说,通过减少可自由支配的行为,支付股息使其不那么不透明。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
6.60
自引率
55.00%
发文量
30
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