{"title":"BANK EARNINGS MANAGEMENT AND DIVIDEND POLICY UNDER AGENCY PROBLEM CONTEXTS","authors":"D. Tran","doi":"10.1142/s2010495220500050","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Using a large sample of U.S. bank holding companies (BHC) from 2000:Q1–2017:Q4, we investigate the impacts of dividend policy to bank earnings management, and document that banks that pay dividends tend to be less opaque than banks that do not pay dividends. The dividend policy not only impacts the conditional average earnings management of banks, but also exerts influence on their dispersion. The impact of dividend policy appears to be more profound for highly opaque banks. We identify different conditions that motivate different discretionary behaviors of banks, which allows us to better observe different managerial motives between dividend-paying and dividend-non-paying banks. Under high information asymmetry context, there is valuably additional information conveyed by paying dividends, and it follows that the role of dividends as a means of conveying information is more pronounced. For banks subject to high agency problems, paying dividends make them to be less opaque through reducing the discretionary behaviors.","PeriodicalId":43570,"journal":{"name":"Annals of Financial Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1142/s2010495220500050","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Annals of Financial Economics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s2010495220500050","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
Using a large sample of U.S. bank holding companies (BHC) from 2000:Q1–2017:Q4, we investigate the impacts of dividend policy to bank earnings management, and document that banks that pay dividends tend to be less opaque than banks that do not pay dividends. The dividend policy not only impacts the conditional average earnings management of banks, but also exerts influence on their dispersion. The impact of dividend policy appears to be more profound for highly opaque banks. We identify different conditions that motivate different discretionary behaviors of banks, which allows us to better observe different managerial motives between dividend-paying and dividend-non-paying banks. Under high information asymmetry context, there is valuably additional information conveyed by paying dividends, and it follows that the role of dividends as a means of conveying information is more pronounced. For banks subject to high agency problems, paying dividends make them to be less opaque through reducing the discretionary behaviors.