On the Strategic Complementarity of Skilled Workers and Technological Innovation: Which Determines Which?

Q3 Economics, Econometrics and Finance
E. Accinelli, Armando García, E. Carrera, Jorge Zazueta
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Abstract

In this document, we analyse the strategic complementarity between technological investment and investment in training by workers. We show that, beyond the importance of the answer to the question about which factor determines which, initial minimal conditions in both factors are required to start a long-run social development process. If these minimums are not met, the economy can become a self-satisfied economy, with a social mediocre performance but, at least in the short run, successful from the individual point of view. We consider that either manager of firms as workers are rational agents who make decisions about their future behaviour, considering the current state of the economy, understanding for such, the percentage of innovative and non-innovative firms in the market and the percentage of skilled and unskilled workers in the labour market. While managers decide the best way to invest, workers decide whether to invest or not in the upgrade or in the development of their skills to face the new challenges posed by technological change. The evolution of the economy is summarized in a complex dynamical system represented by a coupled dynamical system very close to the replicator dynamics considered in evolutionary game theory. In this way, we show that the initial conditions play a crucial role to understand the possibilities of future performance of the economy in each country, and, on the other hand, we analyse the conditions that make possible or necessary the intervention of the government in the economy. JEL Classifications: C72, C73, O11, O55, K42
论技术工人与技术创新的战略互补性:哪个决定哪个?
在这份文件中,我们分析了技术投资和工人培训投资之间的战略互补性。我们表明,除了哪个因素决定哪个问题的答案的重要性之外,启动长期社会发展进程还需要两个因素中的初始最小条件。如果不满足这些最低标准,经济可能会成为一个自我满足的经济体,社会表现平平,但至少在短期内,从个人角度来看是成功的。我们认为,作为工人的公司经理都是理性的代理人,他们会根据当前的经济状况、对这一点的理解、市场上创新和非创新公司的百分比以及劳动力市场中技术工人和非技术工人的百分比,对自己未来的行为做出决定。当管理者决定最佳投资方式时,工人决定是否投资于技能的升级或发展,以应对技术变革带来的新挑战。经济的进化概括为一个复杂的动力系统,该系统由一个耦合动力系统表示,该系统非常接近进化博弈论中考虑的复制动力学。通过这种方式,我们表明,初始条件在理解每个国家未来经济表现的可能性方面发挥着至关重要的作用,另一方面,我们分析了使政府干预经济成为可能或必要的条件。JEL分类:C72、C73、O11、O55、K42
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Studies in Microeconomics
Studies in Microeconomics Economics, Econometrics and Finance-Economics, Econometrics and Finance (all)
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
14
期刊介绍: Studies in Microeconomics seeks high quality theoretical as well as applied (or empirical) research in all areas of microeconomics (broadly defined to include other avenues of decision science such as psychology, political science and organizational behavior). In particular, we encourage submissions in new areas of Microeconomics such as in the fields of Experimental economics and Behavioral Economics. All manuscripts will be subjected to a peer-review process. The intended audience of the journal are professional economists and young researchers with an interest and expertise in microeconomics and above. In addition to full-length articles MIC is interested in publishing and promoting shorter refereed articles (letters and notes) that are pertinent to the specialist in the field of Microeconomics (broadly defined). MIC will periodically publish special issues with themes of particular interest, including articles solicited from leading scholars as well as authoritative survey articles and meta-analysis on the themed topic. We will also publish book reviews related to microeconomics, and MIC encourages publishing articles from policy practitioners dealing with microeconomic issues that have policy relevance under the section Policy Analysis and Debate.
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