A Simple and Procedurally Fair Game Form for Nash Implementation of the No-Envy Solution

IF 0.3 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS

B E Journal of Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2019-09-03 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.3411954

Makoto Hagiwara

引用次数: 3

Abstract

Abstract We consider the allocation problem of infinitely divisible resources with at least three agents. For this problem, Thomson (Games and Economic Behavior, 52: 186-200, 2005) and Doğan (Games and Economic Behavior, 98: 165-171, 2016) propose “simple” but not “procedurally fair” game forms which implement the “no-envy” solution in Nash equilibria. By contrast, Galbiati (Economics Letters, 100: 72-75, 2008) constructs a procedurally fair but not simple game form which implements the no-envy solution in Nash equilibria. In this paper, we design a both simple and procedurally fair game form which implements the no-envy solution in Nash equilibria.

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无嫉妒解的纳什实现的一种简单的程序公平博弈形式

摘要考虑具有至少三个智能体的无限可分资源的分配问题。对于这个问题，Thomson(游戏与经济行为，52:186- 200,2005)和Doğan(游戏与经济行为，98:165- 171,2016)提出了“简单”但不“程序公平”的游戏形式，实现了纳什均衡中的“不嫉妒”解决方案。相比之下，Galbiati (Economics Letters, 100: 72-75, 2008)构建了一个程序公平但不简单的博弈形式，实现了纳什均衡中的无嫉妒解。本文设计了一种既简单又程序公平的博弈形式，实现了纳什均衡中的无嫉妒解。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

B E Journal of Theoretical Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

0.80

自引率

25.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： We welcome submissions in all areas of economic theory, both applied theory and \"pure\" theory. Contributions can be either innovations in economic theory or rigorous new applications of existing theory. Pure theory papers include, but are by no means limited to, those in behavioral economics and decision theory, game theory, general equilibrium theory, and the theory of economic mechanisms. Applications could encompass, but are by no means limited to, contract theory, public finance, financial economics, industrial organization, law and economics, and labor economics.