Criminal Justice, Inc.

IF 3.4 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW
John Rappaport
{"title":"Criminal Justice, Inc.","authors":"John Rappaport","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3059793","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In the past decade, major retailers nationwide have begun to employ a private, for-profit system to settle criminal disputes, extracting payment from shoplifting suspects in exchange for a promise not to call the police. This Article examines what retailers’ decisions reveal about our public system of criminal justice and the concerns of the agents who run it, the victims who rely on it, and the suspects whose lives it alters. The private policing of commercial spaces is well known, as is private incarceration of convicted offenders. This Article is the first, however, to document how industry has penetrated new parts of the criminal process, administering sanctions to resolve thousands of shoplifting allegations each year. \n \nProponents of private justice claim that everyone wins. Critics say it’s blackmail. The Article takes a tentative middle ground: While “retail justice” is not the American ideal, it may nonetheless be preferable to public criminal justice, at least if certain conditions are met. Rather than cancel the private justice experiment, therefore, as several states are poised to do, the government should aim to foster optimal conditions for its success. \n \nExtending the central analysis, the Article then shows how the study of private justice leads to fresh perspectives on important criminal justice issues. It suggests, for example, that the costs to crime victims of assisting the prosecution may be a feature of the system, not a bug, if they encourage victims to invest in efficient crime-deterring precautions. It also complicates legal academic models of police and prosecutorial behavior built on maximizing arrests and convictions. The Article concludes by identifying conditions that conduce to private criminal justice and speculating about the next frontiers.","PeriodicalId":51408,"journal":{"name":"Columbia Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.4000,"publicationDate":"2018-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"10","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Columbia Law Review","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3059793","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 10

Abstract

In the past decade, major retailers nationwide have begun to employ a private, for-profit system to settle criminal disputes, extracting payment from shoplifting suspects in exchange for a promise not to call the police. This Article examines what retailers’ decisions reveal about our public system of criminal justice and the concerns of the agents who run it, the victims who rely on it, and the suspects whose lives it alters. The private policing of commercial spaces is well known, as is private incarceration of convicted offenders. This Article is the first, however, to document how industry has penetrated new parts of the criminal process, administering sanctions to resolve thousands of shoplifting allegations each year. Proponents of private justice claim that everyone wins. Critics say it’s blackmail. The Article takes a tentative middle ground: While “retail justice” is not the American ideal, it may nonetheless be preferable to public criminal justice, at least if certain conditions are met. Rather than cancel the private justice experiment, therefore, as several states are poised to do, the government should aim to foster optimal conditions for its success. Extending the central analysis, the Article then shows how the study of private justice leads to fresh perspectives on important criminal justice issues. It suggests, for example, that the costs to crime victims of assisting the prosecution may be a feature of the system, not a bug, if they encourage victims to invest in efficient crime-deterring precautions. It also complicates legal academic models of police and prosecutorial behavior built on maximizing arrests and convictions. The Article concludes by identifying conditions that conduce to private criminal justice and speculating about the next frontiers.
刑事司法公司
在过去的十年里,全国的主要零售商已经开始采用一种私人的、以营利为目的的系统来解决刑事纠纷,从入店行窃的嫌疑人那里收取报酬,以换取他们承诺不报警。本文考察了零售商的决定揭示了我们的公共刑事司法系统,以及运行该系统的特工、依赖该系统的受害者和生活被该系统改变的嫌疑人的担忧。商业场所的私人警务是众所周知的,对被定罪的罪犯的私人监禁也是如此。然而,本文是第一个记录行业如何渗透到刑事程序的新部分,管理制裁以解决每年数千起入店行窃指控的文章。私人司法的支持者声称每个人都是赢家。批评者说这是勒索。这篇文章采取了一个尝试性的中间立场:虽然“零售司法”不是美国人的理想,但至少在满足某些条件的情况下,它可能比公共刑事司法更可取。因此,政府不应该像一些州准备做的那样取消私人司法实验,而是应该致力于为其成功创造最佳条件。在此基础上,本文展示了对私人司法的研究如何为重要的刑事司法问题带来新的视角。例如,如果犯罪受害者鼓励他们投资于有效的犯罪预防措施,那么协助起诉的犯罪受害者的成本可能是该系统的一个特点,而不是一个缺陷。它还使建立在最大限度地逮捕和定罪基础上的警察和检察官行为的法律学术模型复杂化。文章最后指出了促成私人刑事司法的条件,并对下一个领域进行了推测。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
CiteScore
3.00
自引率
6.90%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: The Columbia Law Review is one of the world"s leading publications of legal scholarship. Founded in 1901, the Review is an independent nonprofit corporation that produces a law journal edited and published entirely by students at Columbia Law School. It is one of a handful of student-edited law journals in the nation that publish eight issues a year. The Review is the third most widely distributed and cited law review in the country. It receives about 2,000 submissions per year and selects approximately 20-25 manuscripts for publication annually, in addition to student Notes. In 2008, the Review expanded its audience with the launch of Sidebar, an online supplement to the Review.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信