Did Russian Cyber Interference in the 2016 Election Violate International Law

IF 2.2 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW
J. Ohlin
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引用次数: 66

Abstract

IntroductionSovereignty is a funny thing. It is allegedly the foundation of the Westphalian order, but its exact contours are frustratingly indeterminate. When it was revealed that the Russian government interfered in the 2016 U.S. presidential election by, among other things, hacking into the e-mail system of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and releasing its e-mails, international lawyers were divided over whether the cyber attack violated international law. President Obama seemingly went out of his way to describe the attack as a mere violation of "established international norms of behavior" and pointedly declined to refer to the cyber attacks as a violation of international law.1Some international lawyers were more willing to describe the cyber attack as a violation of international law.2 However, identifying the exact legal norm that was contravened turns out to be harder than it might otherwise appear. To the layperson, the Russian hacking constituted an impermissible (and perhaps) shocking interference in the American political process-an intervention that nonlawyers would not hesitate to label a "violation of sovereignty" as that term is used in political or diplomatic discourse.3 The problem arises when one attempts to translate that commonsense intuition into legal discourse. At that point, the translation effort breaks down for a variety of reasons.The genesis of the difficulty is that none of the standard rubrics for understanding illegal interventions clearly and unambiguously apply to the facts in question. For example, the Russian interference could simply be viewed as an act of espionage, but it has long been understood (at least until recent controversies in human rights law) that spying violates domestic-but not international-law. An alternative rubric would focus on the intervention aspect of Russia's behavior. The problem here is that the standard-though by no means universally accepted-definition for what counts as an illegal intervention requires doctrinal elements such as coercion that may not be present in this case. So too with regard to the notion of an illegal "usurpation of an inherently governmental function,"4 a legal description that is a poor fit for Russia's hacking during the 2016 election, for reasons that will be more fully articulated below.That being said, it would be a mistake to hastily reject our commonsense intuitions about the impropriety of Russian hacking during the election. The lack of fit with the doctrinal requirements for an illegal intervention against another State's sovereignty is simply an indication that the notions of "sovereignty" and "intervention"-though mainstays of contemporary public international law doctrine-are poorly suited to analyzing the legality of the conduct in this case. A far better rubric for analyzing the behavior is the notion of self-determination, a legal concept that captures the right of a people to decide, for themselves, both their political arrangements (at a systematic level) and their future destiny (at a more granular level of policy). It is precisely this more basic right of self-determination that was violated by Russia's conduct. Unfortunately, the right of self-determination has largely lain fallow since the global process of decolonization was completed,5 with the exception of a few cases of controversial secessions.6 But the Russian hacking campaign is evidence that self-determination's departure from the scene in international law should be mourned and, if possible, reversed because there are situations and cases where the best legal categories for understanding the situation are not sovereignty and intervention but rather the frustratingly imprecise notion of self-determination.7Accordingly, this Article proceeds in three parts. Part I will analyze the law of espionage and spying, which are widespread practices in today's world. Though spying was once condemned as illegal under international law, that historical mistake has been rectified, and most international lawyers agree that spying violates domestic rather than international law. …
俄罗斯网络干预2016年美国大选是否违反国际法
简介主权是一件有趣的事情。据称,它是威斯特伐利亚秩序的基础,但其确切轮廓却令人沮丧地不确定。当俄罗斯政府通过入侵民主党全国委员会(DNC)的电子邮件系统并发布其电子邮件等方式干预2016年美国总统选举时,国际律师对网络攻击是否违反国际法存在分歧。奥巴马总统似乎不遗余力地将此次网络攻击描述为仅仅违反了“既定的国际行为准则”,并明确拒绝将网络攻击称为违反国际法,事实证明,确定被违反的确切法律规范比其他情况下看起来更难。对外行来说,俄罗斯的黑客行为构成了对美国政治进程的不允许的(也许也是)令人震惊的干预——非法律人士会毫不犹豫地将这种干预称为“侵犯主权”,因为政治或外交话语中使用了这个词。3当人们试图将这种常识性直觉转化为法律话语时,问题就出现了。在这一点上,翻译工作由于各种原因而失败。困难的根源在于,理解非法干预的标准准则都不适用于所涉事实。例如,俄罗斯的干涉可以简单地被视为间谍行为,但人们早就知道(至少在最近的人权法争议之前)间谍活动违反了国内法,而不是国际法。另一个准则将侧重于俄罗斯行为的干预方面。这里的问题是,对于什么是非法干预的标准——尽管并非普遍接受的定义——需要胁迫等理论要素,而在这种情况下可能不存在。关于非法“篡夺固有政府职能”的概念也是如此,4这一法律描述不太适合俄罗斯在2016年大选期间的黑客行为,原因将在下文更全面地阐述。话虽如此,匆忙拒绝我们对俄罗斯在选举期间黑客行为不当的常识直觉是错误的。不符合对另一国主权进行非法干预的理论要求,只是表明“主权”和“干预”的概念——尽管当代国际公法理论的支柱不适合分析本案中行为的合法性。分析行为的一个更好的准则是自决概念,这是一个法律概念,它抓住了一个民族自己决定政治安排(在系统层面)和未来命运(在更精细的政策层面)的权利。俄罗斯的行为恰恰侵犯了这种更为基本的自决权。不幸的是,自全球非殖民化进程完成以来,自决权基本上一直处于闲置状态,5只有少数有争议的分裂国家除外。6但俄罗斯的黑客行动证明,自决权脱离国际法的舞台应该受到哀悼,如果可能的话,相反,因为在某些情况下,理解这种情况的最佳法律类别不是主权和干预,而是令人沮丧的不精确的自我决定概念。7因此,本条分为三部分。第一部分分析当今世界普遍存在的间谍活动和间谍活动的规律。尽管根据国际法,间谍活动一度被谴责为非法,但这一历史错误已经得到纠正,大多数国际律师都认为间谍活动违反了国内法,而不是国际法…
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
6.20%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: The Texas Law Review is a national and international leader in legal scholarship. Texas Law Review is an independent journal, edited and published entirely by students at the University of Texas School of Law. Our seven issues per year contain articles by professors, judges, and practitioners; reviews of important recent books from recognized experts, essays, commentaries; and student written notes. Texas Law Review is currently the ninth most cited legal periodical in federal and state cases in the United States and the thirteenth most cited by legal journals.
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