Institutional Rigidity of the Bretton Woods Institutions, Domestic Politics of the U.S. and the Establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

Abstract

What explains the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) by China? While existing studies have debated Chinese motivations behind the creation of the AIIB being revisionist or status quo oriented, we sidestep the debate and instead try to identify conditions that have provided at least a permissive environment for China to propose and establish the AIIB. We contend that the institutional rigidity, the difficulty with which institutional changes can occur over time, of the BWIs played a permissive role in the eventual establishment of the AIIB. We show that China has repeatedly complained its inadequate quota shares since early 2000s, yet its demand for increased quota shares commensurate to its size of economy has met with stiff resistance from status-quo biased countries and with the rigid rules of quota reallocation. The institutional rigidity of the BWIs is further complicated by the salience of the U.S. domestic politics in organizational decision-making of the BWIs. We highlight how the US Congress has effectively exerted a veto power over important decisions at the BWIs and how that has inflated Chinese frustration at the BWIs.