Are founding families less willing to bear risk? Evidence from the currency exposure and internationalization strategy of family firms

IF 2.9 3区 经济学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Ronald C. Anderson, Mikael C. Bergbrant, Delroy M. Hunter, David M. Reeb
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Although theory predicts that family firms should be less willing to bear risk than nonfamily firms, prior empirical papers have not found support for this prediction. In this paper, we focus on conditional currency risk because founding families can relatively easily influence their firms’ currency exposure. We find that family firms have relatively lower conditional currency exposure. This result holds for both descendant-led and nonfamily-led family firms. Consistent with purposeful actions of founding families, we find that exposure decreases with control-enhancing mechanisms, such as excess voting rights. The findings also support a wealth-preservation motive, evidenced by a finding that exposure declines with the number of family beneficiaries. Additional analysis suggests that family firms achieve the relatively lower risk by reducing internationalization depth and limiting exposure to riskier currencies.

创始家族是否不太愿意承担风险?来自家族企业货币风险敞口和国际化战略的证据
虽然理论预测家族企业应该比非家族企业更不愿意承担风险,但之前的实证论文并没有找到支持这一预测的证据。在本文中,我们关注的是有条件的货币风险,因为创始家族可以相对容易地影响其公司的货币敞口。我们发现家族企业的有条件货币风险敞口相对较低。这一结果适用于后代领导的和非家族领导的家族企业。与创始家族有目的的行为一致,我们发现风险敞口随着控制增强机制(如超额投票权)的增加而减少。研究结果还支持财富保值的动机,证据是,随着家庭受益人人数的增加,风险敞口会下降。进一步的分析表明,家族企业通过降低国际化深度和限制风险较高的货币敞口来实现相对较低的风险。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Financial Management
Financial Management BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
6.00
自引率
0.00%
发文量
27
期刊介绍: Financial Management (FM) serves both academics and practitioners concerned with the financial management of nonfinancial businesses, financial institutions, and public or private not-for-profit organizations.
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