A Neo-Republican Critique of AI ethics

Abstract

The AI Ethics literature, aimed to responsibly develop AI systems, widely agrees on the fact that society is in dire need for effective accountability mechanisms with regards to AI systems. Particularly, machine learning (ML) systems cause reason for concern due to their opaque and self-learning characteristics. Nevertheless, what such accountability mechanisms should look like remains either largely unspecified (e.g., ‘stakeholder input’) or ineffective (e.g., ‘ethical guidelines’). In this paper, I argue that the difficulty to formulate and develop effective accountability mechanisms lies partly in the predominant focus on Mill's harm's principle, rooted in the conception of freedom as non-interference. A strong focus on harm overcasts other moral wrongs, such as potentially problematic power dynamics between those who shape the system and those affected by it. I propose that the neo-republican conception of freedom as non-domination provides a suitable framework to inform responsible ML development. Domination, understood by neo-republicans, is a moral wrong as it undermines the potential for human flourishing. In order to mitigate domination, neo-republicans plead for accountability mechanisms that minimize arbitrary relations of power. Neo-republicanism should hence inform responsible ML development as it provides substantive and concrete grounds when accountability mechanisms are effective (i.e. when they are non-dominating).