{"title":"Behavioural Economics in European Corporate Governance – Much Ado about Nudging?","authors":"Marina B. Madsen","doi":"10.54648/eulr2021011","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Shareholder engagement from institutional investors remains a topic on the agenda of both legislators and in the public debate. The recent amendment of the SRD can be seen as a token of a pan-European ‘hardening of shareholder norms’. The arising question is if this hardening is sufficient to change the behaviour of institutional investors. Using insights from behavioural economics, the article discusses if the European Union and national Member States can apply nudging or other insights from behavioural economics to increase shareholder engagement and argues that in order to follow a behaviourally informed strategy, a distinct justification of both the applied means and the pursued purposes is required.\nCorporate governance, European Union, shareholder engagement, active ownership, institutional investors, behavioural economics, choice architecture, nudging, biases, libertarian paternalism","PeriodicalId":53431,"journal":{"name":"European Business Law Review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"European Business Law Review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eulr2021011","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"Social Sciences","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
Shareholder engagement from institutional investors remains a topic on the agenda of both legislators and in the public debate. The recent amendment of the SRD can be seen as a token of a pan-European ‘hardening of shareholder norms’. The arising question is if this hardening is sufficient to change the behaviour of institutional investors. Using insights from behavioural economics, the article discusses if the European Union and national Member States can apply nudging or other insights from behavioural economics to increase shareholder engagement and argues that in order to follow a behaviourally informed strategy, a distinct justification of both the applied means and the pursued purposes is required.
Corporate governance, European Union, shareholder engagement, active ownership, institutional investors, behavioural economics, choice architecture, nudging, biases, libertarian paternalism
期刊介绍:
The mission of the European Business Law Review is to provide a forum for analysis and discussion of business law, including European Union law and the laws of the Member States and other European countries, as well as legal frameworks and issues in international and comparative contexts. The Review moves freely over the boundaries that divide the law, and covers business law, broadly defined, in public or private law, domestic, European or international law. Our topics of interest include commercial, financial, corporate, private and regulatory laws with a broadly business dimension. The Review offers current, authoritative scholarship on a wide range of issues and developments, featuring contributors providing an international as well as a European perspective. The Review is an invaluable source of current scholarship, information, practical analysis, and expert guidance for all practising lawyers, advisers, and scholars dealing with European business law on a regular basis. The Review has over 25 years established the highest scholarly standards. It distinguishes itself as open-minded, embracing interests that appeal to the scholarly, practitioner and policy-making spheres. It practices strict routines of peer review. The Review imposes no word limit on submissions, subject to the appropriateness of the word length to the subject under discussion.