EPISTEMOLOGICAL PREMISES FOR THE CONCEPT OF DIGNITY IN JOHN LOCKE’S PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE

Abstract

The article presents the analysis of the epistemological basis for the concept of dignity in the philosophical discourse of an outstanding English enlightener John Locke. His views on natural rights and freedoms as well as on human dignity, formed within the framework of the Enlightenment formative shifts, haven’t lost their heuristic potential, and moreover, reveal their relevance in the context of the tendencies prevailing in the contemporary dynamic world. In the process of investigation the following methods were applied: dialectical, hermeneutical, phenomenological, and comparative. The research has revealed that John Locke’s concept of dignity, as well as the conception of educating a worthy citizen, directly correlate with his epistemology. Despite the fact that the phraseological unit “tabula rasa” wasn’t mentioned in Locke’s works directly, though having been repeatedly attributed to him, the intention emphasized in this Roman phrase is present in his views. This phrase lied in the basis of his fundamental view that moral ideas couldn’t be inborn. Rejecting the metaphysical basis for human morality, John Locke argued that social differentiation as well as a person’s virtuous or wicked behavior were not rooted in human nature, but on the contrary, were formed by the social environment, especially by the upbringing. This idea presupposed having equal cultural, educational, political, and legal conditions for a person’s social start. Only human striving for happiness could be considered innate. This desire, in its correlation with social progress, was seen as transforming the idea of human dignity. Having been established, Western capitalism gives rise to new competitive possibilities of self-realization, not available for most people before. Consequently, dignity has been increasingly identified with rationality and the level of education and upbringing, as well as with personal and professional success.