The Aftermath of the Suez Crisis: The Reopening of the Canal and Anglo–American Relations

Abstract

ABSTRACT There have been a great number of works on the Suez Crisis, but scarce academic attention has been paid to the process whereby its settlement was achieved. This paper argues that Britain succeeded in securing fairly sufficient Egyptian concessions with support from the US and the UN. The Americans, who had been hostile to the British prior to their agreement to withdraw troops from the Canal Zone, led the effort to make the Egyptians concede during negotiations on the Canal’s reopening. Contrary to the prevailing argument that Britain suffered a political defeat because of international pressure, this paper argues that Britain persuaded the US to acquiesce to the de facto arrangement because of the Canal’s economic value. The deployment of the UNEF brought a certain level of humiliation to Egyptian sovereignty. As Nasser’s influence in Middle Eastern affairs was contained, Britain chose a pragmatic deal with Egypt over the Canal.