{"title":"Performance-oriented management and political appointment: the interaction effect on quality of government","authors":"Hyunjung Kim","doi":"10.1080/12294659.2023.2188626","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Previous studies suggest that reforms of public personnel administration, especially implemented under the initiatives of New Public Management (NPM), increase government efficiency, while bureaucratic politicization is negatively associated with organizational performance and expertise. Yet, few studies provide empirical evidence about the interaction effect between NPM reforms and bureaucratic politicization on government performance. This study focuses on performance-related pay (PRP) reforms in public personnel administration and examines how the relationship between PRP and quality of government changes depending on political appointment. Using cross-country data analysis, findings show that the adoption of PRP is associated with higher quality of government, but the effect is negatively conditioned on the level of political appointment. Where political appointment is low, countries with PRP reforms are more likely to be impartial, efficient, and responsive to changes, but PRP reforms may not be effective for quality of government, where political appointment is pervasive in the civil service.","PeriodicalId":39993,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Public Administration","volume":"28 1","pages":"83 - 108"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Review of Public Administration","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/12294659.2023.2188626","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
ABSTRACT Previous studies suggest that reforms of public personnel administration, especially implemented under the initiatives of New Public Management (NPM), increase government efficiency, while bureaucratic politicization is negatively associated with organizational performance and expertise. Yet, few studies provide empirical evidence about the interaction effect between NPM reforms and bureaucratic politicization on government performance. This study focuses on performance-related pay (PRP) reforms in public personnel administration and examines how the relationship between PRP and quality of government changes depending on political appointment. Using cross-country data analysis, findings show that the adoption of PRP is associated with higher quality of government, but the effect is negatively conditioned on the level of political appointment. Where political appointment is low, countries with PRP reforms are more likely to be impartial, efficient, and responsive to changes, but PRP reforms may not be effective for quality of government, where political appointment is pervasive in the civil service.
期刊介绍:
The International Review of Public Administration (ISSN 1229-4659) is published biannually by the Korean Association for Public Administration (KAPA) to provide a worldwide audience with the opportunity for communication and further understanding on issues of public administration and policy. There will be a triple-blind peer review process for all submissions of articles of general interest. There are no particular limitations on subject areas as long as they are related to the field of public administration and policy or deal with public employees. Articles should be analytic and demonstrate the highest standards of excellence in conceptualization, craftsmanship, and methodology.