Is Blame a Moral Attitude?

IF 0.5 3区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

Philosophical Papers Pub Date : 2022-09-02 DOI:10.1080/05568641.2022.2118156

Roger G. López

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Abstract The present article challenges a widespread view of blame as an inherently moral attitude. I begin by pointing out some features of blame that are not readily explained by, and not obviously compatible with, a moral orientation. To account for those features, I elucidate Nietzsche’s insights that blame responds to frustration and can serve as a bulwark against unwelcome self-perception, drawing as well on modern psychoanalysis’s inheritance of those insights. In the second half of the paper, I critically examine three of the most thorough attempts to root blame in moral foundations, those of George Sher, T.M. Scanlon and Miranda Fricker. I argue that each of these authors overestimates the prevalence and centrality of the influence morality can have on blame, to conclude that blame and morality only dovetail contingently some of the time.

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责备是一种道德态度吗?

摘要本文挑战了一种普遍的观点，即指责是一种内在的道德态度。首先，我要指出责备的一些特点，这些特点不容易用道德取向来解释，也不明显与道德取向相容。为了解释这些特征，我阐明了尼采的见解，即责备回应挫折，可以作为反对不受欢迎的自我感知的堡垒，并借鉴了现代精神分析对这些见解的继承。在本文的后半部分，我批判性地考察了乔治·谢尔(George Sher)、T.M.斯坎伦(T.M. Scanlon)和米兰达·弗里克(Miranda Fricker)三个最彻底地试图将责任归咎于道德基础的人。我认为，这些作者都高估了道德对指责的普遍性和中心性影响，得出的结论是，指责和道德只是在某些时候偶然吻合。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Philosophical Papers PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

2.10

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Philosophical Papers is an international, generalist journal of philosophy edited in South Africa Original Articles: Articles appearing in regular issues are original, high-quality, and stand-alone, and are written for the general professional philosopher. Submissions are welcome in any area of philosophy and undergo a process of peer review based on initial editor screening and refereeing by (usually) two referees. Special Issues: Topic-based special issues are comprised of both invited and submitted papers selected by guest editors. Recent special issues have included ''Philosophy''s Therapeutic Potential'' (2014, editor Dylan Futter); ''Aging and the Elderly'' (2012, editors Tom Martin and Samantha Vice); ''The Problem of the Criterion'' (2011, editor Mark Nelson); ''Retributive Emotions'' (2010, editor Lucy Allais); ‘Rape and its Meaning/s’ (2009, editor Louise du Toit). Calls for papers for upcoming special issues can be found here. Ideas for future special issues are welcome.