Is Audit Quality Higher When Audit Committees Report Strong Oversight?

IF 0.8 Q4 BUSINESS, FINANCE
B. Bratten, Monika Causholli, Valbona Sulcaj
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

This article provides a summary of recent research by Bratten, Causholli, and Sulcaj (2022), who examine whether issuers with audit committees who report strong oversight over the audit function have higher audit quality. Using a novel dataset from Audit Analytics that summarizes reported audit committee activities, Bratten et al. (2022) create a composite measure that captures the strength of the audit committee’s oversight of the audit process. The study uses several measures to capture audit quality, including audit fees, discretionary accruals, and propensity to meet or just beat earnings benchmarks. The authors show that, when issuers’ audit committees report activities consistent with being more active in overseeing the external auditor, issuers, on average, have better audit quality.
审计委员会报告强有力的监督是否会提高审计质量?
本文总结了Bratten、Causholli和Sulcaj(2022)最近的研究,他们研究了拥有审计委员会、报告对审计职能进行强有力监督的发行人是否具有更高的审计质量。Bratten等人(2022)使用审计分析公司的一个新数据集总结了审计委员会报告的活动,创建了一个综合衡量标准,以反映审计委员会对审计过程的监督力度。该研究使用了几种衡量审计质量的指标,包括审计费用、可自由支配应计项目以及达到或超过盈利基准的倾向。作者表明,当发行人的审计委员会报告的活动与更积极地监督外部审计师一致时,发行人的平均审计质量更好。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Current Issues in Auditing
Current Issues in Auditing BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
1.60
自引率
12.50%
发文量
19
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