Properties of bundle valuations in carrier collaboration.

IF 1.4 4区 管理学 Q3 OPERATIONS RESEARCH & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
Rudolf Vetschera, Dmitriy Knyazev, Daniel Rehsmann
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Combinatorial auctions are an important part of many frameworks for carrier collaboration in logistics. In the last years, many innovative auction mechanisms have been developed in the economic literature that could potentially be applied in this context and that could significantly simplify the process of determining efficient allocations of requests. These mechanisms rely on certain assumptions about the valuations of bidders. In this paper, we perform computational experiments to analyze to which extent these requirements are fulfilled for valuations derived from a simple logistics problem, the Traveling Salesman Problem. We find that bidders' valuations typically violate even very elementary requirements, but that these violations affect only a limited number of request bundles. We further analyze whether these violations exhibit a consistent pattern across multiple carriers and check consistency if route lengths are calculated exactly or approximated.

Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10100-023-00873-1.

运营商协作中捆绑估值的性质
组合拍卖是许多物流承运商协作框架的重要组成部分。过去几年中,经济学文献中提出了许多创新的拍卖机制,这些机制有可能应用于这一领域,并能大大简化确定有效分配请求的过程。这些机制依赖于对投标人估值的某些假设。在本文中,我们进行了计算实验,分析从简单的物流问题--旅行推销员问题--中得出的估值在多大程度上满足了这些要求。我们发现,投标人的估值通常甚至会违反非常基本的要求,但这些违规行为只影响有限数量的请求捆绑。我们进一步分析了这些违规行为在多个承运人之间是否表现出一致的模式,并检查了路线长度是精确计算还是近似计算的一致性:在线版本包含补充材料,可查阅 10.1007/s10100-023-00873-1。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Central European Journal of Operations Research
Central European Journal of Operations Research 管理科学-运筹学与管理科学
CiteScore
4.70
自引率
11.80%
发文量
30
审稿时长
3 months
期刊介绍: The Central European Journal of Operations Research provides an international readership with high quality papers that cover the theory and practice of OR and the relationship of OR methods to modern quantitative economics and business administration. The focus is on topics such as: - finance and banking - measuring productivity and efficiency in the public sector - environmental and energy issues - computational tools for strategic decision support - production management and logistics - planning and scheduling The journal publishes theoretical papers as well as application-oriented contributions and practical case studies. Occasionally, special issues feature a particular area of OR or report on the results of scientific meetings.
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