Rudolf Vetschera, Dmitriy Knyazev, Daniel Rehsmann
{"title":"Properties of bundle valuations in carrier collaboration.","authors":"Rudolf Vetschera, Dmitriy Knyazev, Daniel Rehsmann","doi":"10.1007/s10100-023-00873-1","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Combinatorial auctions are an important part of many frameworks for carrier collaboration in logistics. In the last years, many innovative auction mechanisms have been developed in the economic literature that could potentially be applied in this context and that could significantly simplify the process of determining efficient allocations of requests. These mechanisms rely on certain assumptions about the valuations of bidders. In this paper, we perform computational experiments to analyze to which extent these requirements are fulfilled for valuations derived from a simple logistics problem, the Traveling Salesman Problem. We find that bidders' valuations typically violate even very elementary requirements, but that these violations affect only a limited number of request bundles. We further analyze whether these violations exhibit a consistent pattern across multiple carriers and check consistency if route lengths are calculated exactly or approximated.</p><p><strong>Supplementary information: </strong>The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10100-023-00873-1.</p>","PeriodicalId":9689,"journal":{"name":"Central European Journal of Operations Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4000,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11032298/pdf/","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Central European Journal of Operations Research","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10100-023-00873-1","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"2023/7/26 0:00:00","PubModel":"Epub","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"OPERATIONS RESEARCH & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Combinatorial auctions are an important part of many frameworks for carrier collaboration in logistics. In the last years, many innovative auction mechanisms have been developed in the economic literature that could potentially be applied in this context and that could significantly simplify the process of determining efficient allocations of requests. These mechanisms rely on certain assumptions about the valuations of bidders. In this paper, we perform computational experiments to analyze to which extent these requirements are fulfilled for valuations derived from a simple logistics problem, the Traveling Salesman Problem. We find that bidders' valuations typically violate even very elementary requirements, but that these violations affect only a limited number of request bundles. We further analyze whether these violations exhibit a consistent pattern across multiple carriers and check consistency if route lengths are calculated exactly or approximated.
Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10100-023-00873-1.
期刊介绍:
The Central European Journal of Operations Research provides an international readership with high quality papers that cover the theory and practice of OR and the relationship of OR methods to modern quantitative economics and business administration.
The focus is on topics such as:
- finance and banking
- measuring productivity and efficiency in the public sector
- environmental and energy issues
- computational tools for strategic decision support
- production management and logistics
- planning and scheduling
The journal publishes theoretical papers as well as application-oriented contributions and practical case studies. Occasionally, special issues feature a particular area of OR or report on the results of scientific meetings.