{"title":"The abstract presumption of harm in the Damages Directive: overconcern of overcompensation","authors":"Peter van Wijck, Franziska Weber","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2021.1979777","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper is focussed on the implementation of the presumption of harm for cartels, as formulated in art. 17.2 of Directive 2014/104/EU. In most Member States the overcharge is presumed to be 0% unless proven otherwise. In two Member States this is 10% and in one it is 20%. These can be considered as three defaults. Damages litigation may lead to under- or overcompensation. Achieving full compensation is rather a coincidence. If harm is de facto substantially lower (higher) than the default, the infringer (victim) has an incentive to prove the actual level of harm. Different choices regarding the presumptions of harm imply a difference in the weighing of under- and overcompensation. A 0% default suggests that preventing overcompensation is the dominant goal. A 10% default will be more effective than a 0% default in serving the compensatory function.","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":"18 1","pages":"204 - 227"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"European Competition Journal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2021.1979777","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"Social Sciences","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
ABSTRACT This paper is focussed on the implementation of the presumption of harm for cartels, as formulated in art. 17.2 of Directive 2014/104/EU. In most Member States the overcharge is presumed to be 0% unless proven otherwise. In two Member States this is 10% and in one it is 20%. These can be considered as three defaults. Damages litigation may lead to under- or overcompensation. Achieving full compensation is rather a coincidence. If harm is de facto substantially lower (higher) than the default, the infringer (victim) has an incentive to prove the actual level of harm. Different choices regarding the presumptions of harm imply a difference in the weighing of under- and overcompensation. A 0% default suggests that preventing overcompensation is the dominant goal. A 10% default will be more effective than a 0% default in serving the compensatory function.
期刊介绍:
The European Competition Journal publishes outstanding scholarly articles relating to European competition law and economics. Its mission is to help foster learning and debate about how European competition law and policy can continue to develop in an economically rational way. Articles published in the Journal are subject to rigorous peer review by leading experts from around Europe. Topics include: -Vertical and Conglomerate Mergers -Enlargement of the Union - the ramifications for Competition Policy -Unilateral and Coordinated Effects in Merger Control -Modernisation of European Competition law -Cartels and Leniency.