{"title":"A Lesser Being. From Louis Marin to Simondon and Back","authors":"Emmanuel Alloa","doi":"10.7146/nja.v30i61-62.127841","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"How to qualify the changing ontology of the image—that is the suggestive as well as provocative question we are invited to answer in this questionnaire. The question itself is formulated rather vaguely, and leaves space for at least two interpretations: Does it mean that the ontology of the image is undergoing a major change today (because of the mutation in its materialities, its codes, its modes of circulation, for instance)? Or does it mean that the ontology of the image—its imaginal or iconic being— could never be addressed other than in terms of inconstancy and change? Either interpretation is suggestive and provocative, as it either hints at a change within ontology or at an ontology of change. Both interpretations, however, presuppose that we can address images in ontological terms at all, and that visual studies should talk about images qua being. For sure, for centuries, a lasting onto-theological tradition made such an endeavour unthinkable: in Aristotelian metaphysics, images belong to a category of relational entities that have no substantial existence of their own, while in a Platonic setting, images are defined by their lack of being. While excessive in their appearance, they are deficient with respect to the being they depict.1 Against the backdrop of such a lack that expresses itself in the guise of falsehood (pseudos) or non-being (mè on), images can’t be grafted onto an ontology; or, inversely, they can’t offer secure grounds for any ontology to come. If the point of any ontology is to study what remains unchanged of a being throughout all its contingent alterations, both the idea of a change within the ontology of the image as well as the idea of an ontology of change tout court must resonate rather oddly. Either the contemporary image changes to a point that it becomes something radically diverse, setting up an altogether new way of being that has nothing in common with what was before. Or it forces, in its ever-changing modes, to change the very project of what we call ontology, beyond the substantiality of the unmodified. Undeniably, the current fixation of certain regions of the social","PeriodicalId":38858,"journal":{"name":"Nordic Journal of Aesthetics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Nordic Journal of Aesthetics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.7146/nja.v30i61-62.127841","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"Arts and Humanities","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
How to qualify the changing ontology of the image—that is the suggestive as well as provocative question we are invited to answer in this questionnaire. The question itself is formulated rather vaguely, and leaves space for at least two interpretations: Does it mean that the ontology of the image is undergoing a major change today (because of the mutation in its materialities, its codes, its modes of circulation, for instance)? Or does it mean that the ontology of the image—its imaginal or iconic being— could never be addressed other than in terms of inconstancy and change? Either interpretation is suggestive and provocative, as it either hints at a change within ontology or at an ontology of change. Both interpretations, however, presuppose that we can address images in ontological terms at all, and that visual studies should talk about images qua being. For sure, for centuries, a lasting onto-theological tradition made such an endeavour unthinkable: in Aristotelian metaphysics, images belong to a category of relational entities that have no substantial existence of their own, while in a Platonic setting, images are defined by their lack of being. While excessive in their appearance, they are deficient with respect to the being they depict.1 Against the backdrop of such a lack that expresses itself in the guise of falsehood (pseudos) or non-being (mè on), images can’t be grafted onto an ontology; or, inversely, they can’t offer secure grounds for any ontology to come. If the point of any ontology is to study what remains unchanged of a being throughout all its contingent alterations, both the idea of a change within the ontology of the image as well as the idea of an ontology of change tout court must resonate rather oddly. Either the contemporary image changes to a point that it becomes something radically diverse, setting up an altogether new way of being that has nothing in common with what was before. Or it forces, in its ever-changing modes, to change the very project of what we call ontology, beyond the substantiality of the unmodified. Undeniably, the current fixation of certain regions of the social