Internal control and financial reporting quality of small firms

IF 3.6 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
J. Krishnan, Jayanth K. Krishnan, Sophie Liang
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引用次数: 8

Abstract

The Dodd–Frank Act of 2010 exempts small, non-accelerated filers from compliance with Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) Section 404b internal control audits. However, these firms are required to comply with other internal control regulations, namely, SOX Sections 302 and 404a, starting in 2002 and 2007, respectively. A small number of these firms also voluntarily adopted (and sometimes dropped) Section 404b during 2004-2010. The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of a series of internal control regulations introduced by SOX on the financial reporting quality of small firms.,The research design for this study is empirical. Using unsigned and signed discretionary accruals as measures of financial reporting quality, the authors compare the financial reporting quality for adopters and non-adopters across four regulation regimes over the period 2000-2010: PRESOX, SOX 302, SOX 404a and SOX 404b.,The results indicate that most of the adopters and non-adopters benefited from SOX 302 and 404a compared with the PRESOX period. However, only the non-adopters gained incrementally when moving from SOX 302 to SOX 404a. Also, Section 404b benefited firms with material weaknesses, as well as firms without material weaknesses that had the lowest reporting quality, in the PRESOX period.,This study helps inform the important policy debate on whether to increase the threshold that is used for the SOX 404b exemption. It shows incremental benefits for firms that adopted Section 404b audits, even when they were complying with Section 302 and Section 404a. Consequently, extending the exemption to more companies would result in a loss of the reporting quality benefit of 404b.,This study contributes to the literature by focusing exclusively on non-accelerated filers and by examining differences across four regulation regimes over a long window compared to prior studies. It provides evidence that the financial reporting benefit of SOX 404b is not transitional, but rather extends for a few years even after some firms discontinued the 404b audits.
小企业内部控制与财务报告质量
2010年的《多德-弗兰克法案》免除了小型非加速申报人遵守《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》(SOX)第404b条内部控制审计的义务。然而,这些公司必须遵守其他内部控制法规,即SOX第302条和第404a条,分别从2002年和2007年开始。其中一小部分公司也在2004-2010年间自愿采用(有时甚至放弃)第404b条。本研究的目的是调查SOX引入的一系列内部控制法规对小企业财务报告质量的影响。,本研究的研究设计是实证的。作者使用未签署和签署的自由支配应计项目作为财务报告质量的衡量标准,比较了2000-2010年期间四种监管制度下采用者和非采用者的财务报告质量:PRESOX、SOX 302、SOX 404a和SOX 404b。,结果表明,与PRESOX时期相比,大多数采用者和非采用者受益于SOX 302和404a。然而,当从SOX 302转移到SOX 404a时,只有非采用者获得了增量收益。此外,第404b条使有重大弱点的公司以及没有重大弱点的报告质量最低的公司在PRESOX期间受益。,这项研究有助于为是否提高SOX 404b豁免门槛的重要政策辩论提供信息。它显示了采用第404b条审计的公司的增量收益,即使它们遵守了第302条和第404a条。因此,将豁免范围扩大到更多的公司将导致404b的报告质量效益损失。,这项研究专门关注非加速申报者,并在很长一段时间内检查了四种监管制度与先前研究的差异,从而为文献做出了贡献。它提供的证据表明,SOX 404b的财务报告效益并不是过渡性的,而是在一些公司停止404b审计后仍会持续几年。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
18
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