{"title":"The Genesis of Action in Husserl’s Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins","authors":"N. Spano","doi":"10.1080/00071773.2021.1909426","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In the present article, I discuss Husserl’s analysis of the genesis of action in the Husserliana edition Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins. My aim is to clarify how a “voluntary action” has its genetic phenomenological origin in a “non-voluntary doing”, and, in turn, clarify how this latter activity has its genetic phenomenological origin in a passive “tendency” of the will. In order to achieve this aim, I first present the characterization of voluntary action as a “volitional process”. Then, I delimit the full scope of voluntary actions by analysing Husserl’s descriptions of the different degrees of “voluntariness”. After that, I explicate how voluntary actions phenomenologically originate from non-voluntary doings by examining the “consciousness of the I can”. Finally, I disclose the genetic phenomenological origin of non-voluntary doings by addressing the experience of tendency in the sphere of “passivity of the will”.","PeriodicalId":44348,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY","volume":"53 1","pages":"118 - 132"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1000,"publicationDate":"2021-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/00071773.2021.1909426","citationCount":"5","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2021.1909426","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Abstract
ABSTRACT In the present article, I discuss Husserl’s analysis of the genesis of action in the Husserliana edition Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins. My aim is to clarify how a “voluntary action” has its genetic phenomenological origin in a “non-voluntary doing”, and, in turn, clarify how this latter activity has its genetic phenomenological origin in a passive “tendency” of the will. In order to achieve this aim, I first present the characterization of voluntary action as a “volitional process”. Then, I delimit the full scope of voluntary actions by analysing Husserl’s descriptions of the different degrees of “voluntariness”. After that, I explicate how voluntary actions phenomenologically originate from non-voluntary doings by examining the “consciousness of the I can”. Finally, I disclose the genetic phenomenological origin of non-voluntary doings by addressing the experience of tendency in the sphere of “passivity of the will”.