Addressing Heteronormativity: The Not-So-Lost Requirement of Discretion in (Austrian) Asylum Law

Abstract

In refugee matters concerning sexual orientation, ‘discretion’ reasoning is as commonplace as it is unlawful. In its 2013 ruling in X, Y, and Z, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) declared that it was unreasonable to expect that asylum seekers should conceal their sexual orientation by being ‘discreet’ in order to avoid persecution, and that such a requirement in domestic refugee status determination procedures would be incompatible with European Union (EU) law. However, this did not put an end to the matter. Discretion reasoning still forms part of the process to determine refugee status in many EU countries. This article examines the persistence of discretion reasoning, using Austria as an example. It argues that, whilst the CJEU definitively banned such reasoning, the court failed to give any indication as to how decision makers should proceed from this point. X, Y, and Z has thus created a legal vacuum, and there is a risk that normative sociocultural concepts like heteronormativity will be applied in such cases. Indeed, despite the CJEU ruling, it is still common in many societies to expect that LGBTIQ people be discreet. As such, decision makers may find themselves imposing a discretion requirement, even if unconsciously. The main aim of the article is to assess the resulting persistence of discretion reasoning through the lens of heteronormativity, and to provide practical suggestions for assessing refugee status in a way that ensures discretion is no longer required.