WTO Dispute Settlement and Rule-Making: One Crisis or Two?

Abstract

The World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreements can be thought of as an incomplete contract that needs to be completed either through renegotiation, the judiciary, or non-judicial interpretation. It provides for all three, but only the judicial route has functioned regularly. With that route now (also) in crisis, there is doubt whether the contract itself can continue to deliver the relative stability and openness in trade policy that has underpinned exceptional global economic performance post World War II. The paper asks whether the multiple crises in the WTO might stem from a common cause of institutional design or culture. New challenges such as climate change and the interface of technology and security may brutally expose further implications of this weakness. The paper concludes with thoughts on a way out. Dispute settlement, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), International Monetary Fund (IMF), International trade, World Trade Organization (WTO), WTO reform