A Husserlian contribution: concerning intentional movement and understanding in sporting activities

Abstract

ABSTRACT This article contributes to an ongoing discussion within sports philosophy concerning how to understand intentional movement in sporting activities. The operations of ‘representation intentionality’, ‘motor intentionality’ and ‘muscular intentionality’ play an increasing role in the attempt to nuance the relation between mind, body and world involved in physical activities. While most scholars tend to reduce one aspect to the other, Breivik has suggested that we can gain a more integrated picture combining the different forms of intentionality as different layers of understanding in action. Though different perspectives of intentionality certainly illuminate different aspects of actions, we believe the ontological implications such an eclectic model entails exceeds the potential benefits. In this article we present a critical evaluation of the exact meaning and exploratory scope of these perspectives by entering into a dialogue with Breivik’s main sources, Rizzolatti, Merleau-Ponty and Searle. We argue that we can achieve a more consistent theory by reconceptualizing the different ‘layers of intentionality’ as different ‘levels of embodiment’ within a Husserlian frame of hermeneutic phenomenology. Finally, we empathize Husserl’s potential contribution to the field of sports philosophy illustrated through sporting examples with a focus on climbing.