Separation of Powers in Distress: AMLO’s Charismatic Populism and Mexico’s Return to Hyper-presidentialism

Abstract

This article inquires the charismatic populism of López Obrador (AMLO) and Mexico’s return to hyper-presidentialism. Drawing on the literature on populism and hyper-presidentialism it explores the tension between charismatic populist leadership and independent institutions, especially the Supreme Court and the National Electoral Institute serving as a counterbalance to the president’s agenda, which aims for institutional ‘transformation’. The main argument, that AMLO is defying the integrity and independence of these institutions, is sustained by analyzing a) the Zaldívar Law named after the former Supreme Court President, a last-minute amendment that would extend his term; b) the public consultation on the prosecution of former presidents; c) the recall vote, and d) the electoral reform. The article concludes that AMLO’s charismatic populism, his transgression of constitutional constraints to the executive power and use of meta-constitutional powers means a return to hyper-presidentialism, which also raises concerns about Mexico’s struggling democracy.