The ‘Essential Practices’ Doctrine

IF 0.3 Q3 LAW
D. K. Kaul
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

This article explores how the Supreme Court of India, in applying the judicial doctrine of ‘essential practices’, has embarked on a dangerous exercise of determining whether a particular religious practice is significant enough to warrant constitutional protection under Article 25(1) or not. In tracing a string of judgments, it shows how courts have been guilty of making ill-founded observations about the validity of religious practices, thereby detrimentally affecting religious groups and minorities. Due to this constitutional transgression, the question of ‘what is essentially religious’ turned into the question of ‘what is essential in religion’. The court has neither the right nor the expertise to decide if the religious practice indeed is ‘essential’. State intervention is warranted only based on constitutionally stipulated restrictions of ‘public order’, ‘morality’ and ‘health’. The cardinal rule ought to be of limited state intervention but maximum protection.
“基本实践”原则
本文探讨了印度最高法院如何在应用“基本实践”的司法原则时,开始了一项危险的行动,即确定特定的宗教实践是否足够重要,足以根据第25(1)条获得宪法保护。在追溯一系列判决的过程中,它显示了法院是如何对宗教习俗的有效性做出了毫无根据的观察,从而对宗教团体和少数群体产生了不利影响。由于这一违反宪法的行为,“什么本质上是宗教”的问题变成了“什么是宗教的本质”的问题。法院既没有权利也没有专业知识来决定宗教实践是否确实是“必要的”。只有根据宪法规定的对"公共秩序"、"道德"和"健康"的限制,才有必要进行国家干预。最基本的规则应该是国家干预有限,而保护最大化。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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CiteScore
1.00
自引率
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