Passivity on the Board of Directors

IF 1.9 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Review of Corporate Finance Studies Pub Date : 2022-03-14 DOI:10.1093/rcfs/cfac012

C. Yung

引用次数: 0

Abstract

A CEO proposes a strategic plan to a board of directors acting in an advisory role. Each director supports the plan, opposes it, or delays speaking until other directors act. The option to delay suppresses dissent from bad plans in equilibrium. Delay has a pronounced impact for important decisions and for firms with reputable CEOs who make few errors. I investigate the role of ordering, that is, when directors should be invited to speak as a function of their signal precision.

查看原文本刊更多论文

董事会的被动

首席执行官向担任顾问的董事会提出战略计划。每位董事都支持、反对或推迟发言，直到其他董事采取行动。延迟的选择抑制了对处于平衡状态的糟糕计划的异议。延迟对重要决策和拥有声誉良好、几乎不会犯错的首席执行官的公司有着明显的影响。我调查了排序的作用，也就是说，什么时候应该邀请董事发言，这是他们信号准确性的函数。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

求助全文

约1分钟内获得全文求助全文

来源期刊

Review of Corporate Finance Studies BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

17.80

自引率

1.80%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Review of Corporate Finance Studies (RCFS) is dedicated to publishing high-quality research in the expansive field of Corporate Finance. The journal seeks original contributions, reviewing papers based on their unique insights into Corporate Finance. This encompasses a wide spectrum, including a firm's interactions with stakeholders, capital markets, internal organization structure, compensation mechanisms, corporate governance, and capital management. RCFS also welcomes research in financial intermediation, financial institutions, microstructure, and the implications of asset pricing for Corporate Finance. The journal considers theoretical, empirical, and experimental papers for review.