Can you trust your lawyer's call? Legal advisers exhibit myside bias resistant to debiasing interventions

IF 1.2 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW
Mihael A. Jeklic
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Abstract

In a vast majority of disputes, settlement is superior to litigation, which involves uncertainty, legal fees, and opportunity cost. Unnecessary litigation also causes judicial backlog, wastes resources, and increases societal conflict. Major contributors to the lack of settlement are intransigent litigants who harbor overoptimistic predictions of litigation outcomes, even though they are looking at identical facts and applicable law. A study (N = 166) found significant myside bias in the participants' predictions of a judicial award (claimants' advisers expected awards that were 69% higher than defendants' advisers) and in their evaluation of arguments (both sides thought the arguments supporting their side were 30% more convincing than the arguments supporting their counterparty). Debiasing interventions—alerting to the myside bias, considering the perspective of the counterparty and dialectical bootstrapping—reduced the bias but did not eliminate it. Exploratory investigation indicated that a large proportion of advisers exhibited naïve realism and bias blind spot, and that cognitive reflection provided a limited measure of resistance to myside bias.

Abstract Image

你能相信你律师的电话吗?法律顾问对消除偏见的干预表现出自我偏见
在绝大多数纠纷中,和解优于诉讼,后者涉及不确定性、法律费用和机会成本。不必要的诉讼还会造成司法积压,浪费资源,增加社会矛盾。无法达成和解的主要原因是不妥协的诉讼当事人,他们对诉讼结果抱有过于乐观的预测,即使他们看到的是相同的事实和适用的法律。一项研究(N = 166)发现,在参与者对司法裁决的预测(原告的顾问预期的裁决比被告的顾问高69%)和他们对论点的评估(双方都认为支持自己一方的论点比支持对方的论点更有说服力30%)中,存在显著的我方偏见。消除偏见的干预——提醒自身的偏见,考虑对方的观点和辩证的引导——减少了偏见,但没有消除它。探索性调查表明,很大一部分顾问表现出naïve现实主义和偏见盲点,认知反思对我方偏见提供了有限的抵抗措施。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.30
自引率
11.80%
发文量
34
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