Could God Love Cruelty?

IF 0.4 0 PHILOSOPHY
L. Callahan
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

One of the foremost objections to theological voluntarism is the contingency objection. If God’s will fixes moral facts, then what if God willed that agents engage in cruelty? I argue that even unrestricted theological voluntarists should accept some logical constraints on possible moral systems—hence, some limits on ways that God could have willed morality to be—and these logical constraints are sufficient to blunt the force of the contingency objection. One constraint I defend is a very weak accessibility requirement, related to (but less problematic than) existence internalism in metaethics. The theological voluntarist can maintain: Godcouldn’t have loved cruelty, and even though he could have willed behaviors we find abhorrent, he could only have done so in a world of deeply alien moral agents. We cannot confidently declare such a world unacceptable.
上帝会喜欢残忍吗?
对神学唯意志论最主要的反对意见之一是偶然性反对。如果上帝的意志固定了道德事实,那么如果上帝意志特工从事残忍行为呢?我认为,即使是不受限制的神学唯意志论者也应该接受对可能的道德体系的一些逻辑约束——因此,对上帝本可以希望道德成为的方式的一些限制——这些逻辑约束足以削弱偶然性反对的力量。我捍卫的一个约束是一个非常弱的可访问性要求,与元伦理学中的存在内在主义有关(但问题比后者少)。神学唯意志论者可以坚持认为:上帝不可能喜欢残忍,即使他可能会做出我们认为令人憎恶的行为,但他只能在一个道德代理人极度陌生的世界里这样做。我们不能自信地宣布这样一个世界是不可接受的。
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