Group-Specific Responses to Retrospective Economic Performance: A Multilevel Analysis of Parliamentary Elections

IF 4.1 2区社会学 Q1 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Politics & Society Pub Date : 2021-02-04 DOI:10.1177/0032329221989150

Abel Bojar, Tim Vlandas

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引用次数: 4

Abstract

What is the relationship between electoral and economic performance? Previous literature posits that poor economic performance hurts the incumbent at the ballot box because overall economic performance serves as a competence signal, which voters can readily access at low costs. Building on an emerging economic voting literature exploring heterogeneity in the electorate, this article argues that social groups are affected differently by various dimensions of economic performance and that their sociotropic sanctioning of incumbents is contingent on the retrospective performance of these dimensions. It theorizes how four social groups—low-skilled workers, pensioners, public sector employees, and high-income individuals—are differently affected by each of four economic dimensions: unemployment, inflation, stock market performance, and public spending; as a result, they penalize the incumbent to varying extents. Results from a multilevel logistic regression analysis from four modules of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems containing around seventy electoral contexts are consistent with the argument.

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对回顾经济表现的群体特定反应:议会选举的多层次分析

选举和经济表现之间的关系是什么？先前的文献认为，糟糕的经济表现会伤害投票箱中的现任者，因为整体经济表现是一个能力信号，选民可以很容易地以低成本获得。在探索选民异质性的新兴经济投票文献的基础上，本文认为，社会群体受到经济表现各个维度的不同影响，他们对现任者的反社会制裁取决于这些维度的追溯表现。它理论化了四个社会群体——低技能工人、养老金领取者、公共部门雇员和高收入个人——如何受到四个经济维度的不同影响：失业、通货膨胀、股市表现和公共支出；因此，他们在不同程度上惩罚现任者。选举制度比较研究的四个模块包含大约70个选举背景，其多层次逻辑回归分析结果与论点一致。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Politics & Society Multiple-

CiteScore

5.00

自引率

4.20%

发文量

期刊介绍： Politics & Society is a peer-reviewed journal. All submitted papers are read by a rotating editorial board member. If a paper is deemed potentially publishable, it is sent to another board member, who, if agreeing that it is potentially publishable, sends it to a third board member. If and only if all three agree, the paper is sent to the entire editorial board for consideration at board meetings. The editorial board meets three times a year, and the board members who are present (usually between 9 and 14) make decisions through a deliberative process that also considers written reports from absent members. Unlike many journals which rely on 1–3 individual blind referee reports and a single editor with final say, the peers who decide whether to accept submitted work are thus the full editorial board of the journal, comprised of scholars from various disciplines, who discuss papers openly, with author names known, at meetings. Editors are required to disclose potential conflicts of interest when evaluating manuscripts and to recuse themselves from voting if such a potential exists.