Mutual monitoring in multi-period teams: an experimental investigation

IF 1.6 Q3 MANAGEMENT

Team Performance Management Pub Date : 2021-03-26 DOI:10.1108/TPM-03-2020-0021

Anthony D. Nikias, Aida Sy

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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine whether managers punish more and work harder in teams with peer monitoring when it is less costly to punish in a two-period, one-shot horizon. Design/methodology/approach An experiment is conducted in a two-period horizon with two treatments. The structure of performance measures makes it costless or costly to punish in the second period. Findings The results find punishing, contingent on first-period strategies, was significantly greater when it was costless compared to costly, as expected. Working, which is analogous to cooperating in prisoner dilemma games, was also significantly greater in the first and second periods when punishing was costless. Practical implications This paper is informative about the potential benefits of performance measures in dynamic team environments, which can be challenging and costly to develop. It adds insight into the design of self-discipline and tasks in teams which might help increase productivity. Originality/value This paper is related to the research on indefinite horizons, which attributes increases in cooperation to the existence of subgame perfect strategies to cooperate and potential gains from future cooperation. In comparison, this study examines the effects of the existence of subgame perfect strategies to work in isolation from the potential gains from future interactions. In addition, it examines whether their potential benefits depend on the cost of punishing when punishing is subgame perfect in a one-shot horizon.

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多时期团队相互监测的实验研究

目的本文的目的是检验在有同伴监督的团队中，当在两段时间内一次性惩罚成本较低时，管理者是否会惩罚更多，工作更努力。设计/方法/方法在两个周期内进行两种处理的实验。绩效衡量标准的结构使第二阶段的惩罚成本较低或成本较高。结果发现，与预期的成本相比，当成本较低时，惩罚（取决于第一阶段的策略）明显更大。类似于在囚犯困境游戏中合作的工作，在惩罚成本较低的第一和第二阶段也显著增加。实际含义本文介绍了动态团队环境中绩效指标的潜在好处，这可能具有挑战性，开发成本高昂。它增加了对团队自律和任务设计的洞察力，这可能有助于提高生产力。独创性/价值本文与无限视野的研究有关，该研究将合作的增加归因于亚游戏完美合作策略的存在以及未来合作的潜在收益。相比之下，本研究考察了亚游戏完美策略的存在对未来互动的潜在收益的影响。此外，它还考察了当惩罚在一次性范围内是完美的时，他们的潜在利益是否取决于惩罚的成本。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Team Performance Management MANAGEMENT-

CiteScore

3.40

自引率

29.40%

发文量

期刊介绍： This international journal contributes to the successful implementation and development of work teams and team-based organizations by providing a forum for sharing experience and learning to stimulate thought and transfer of ideas. It seeks to bridge the gap between research and practice by publishing articles where the claims are evidence-based and the conclusions have practical value. Effective teams form the heart of every successful organization. But team management is one of the hardest challenges faced by managers.