{"title":"Mutual monitoring in multi-period teams: an experimental investigation","authors":"Anthony D. Nikias, Aida Sy","doi":"10.1108/TPM-03-2020-0021","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\nPurpose\nThe purpose of this paper is to examine whether managers punish more and work harder in teams with peer monitoring when it is less costly to punish in a two-period, one-shot horizon.\n\n\nDesign/methodology/approach\nAn experiment is conducted in a two-period horizon with two treatments. The structure of performance measures makes it costless or costly to punish in the second period.\n\n\nFindings\nThe results find punishing, contingent on first-period strategies, was significantly greater when it was costless compared to costly, as expected. Working, which is analogous to cooperating in prisoner dilemma games, was also significantly greater in the first and second periods when punishing was costless.\n\n\nPractical implications\nThis paper is informative about the potential benefits of performance measures in dynamic team environments, which can be challenging and costly to develop. It adds insight into the design of self-discipline and tasks in teams which might help increase productivity.\n\n\nOriginality/value\nThis paper is related to the research on indefinite horizons, which attributes increases in cooperation to the existence of subgame perfect strategies to cooperate and potential gains from future cooperation. In comparison, this study examines the effects of the existence of subgame perfect strategies to work in isolation from the potential gains from future interactions. In addition, it examines whether their potential benefits depend on the cost of punishing when punishing is subgame perfect in a one-shot horizon.\n","PeriodicalId":46084,"journal":{"name":"Team Performance Management","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6000,"publicationDate":"2021-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Team Performance Management","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1108/TPM-03-2020-0021","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"MANAGEMENT","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether managers punish more and work harder in teams with peer monitoring when it is less costly to punish in a two-period, one-shot horizon.
Design/methodology/approach
An experiment is conducted in a two-period horizon with two treatments. The structure of performance measures makes it costless or costly to punish in the second period.
Findings
The results find punishing, contingent on first-period strategies, was significantly greater when it was costless compared to costly, as expected. Working, which is analogous to cooperating in prisoner dilemma games, was also significantly greater in the first and second periods when punishing was costless.
Practical implications
This paper is informative about the potential benefits of performance measures in dynamic team environments, which can be challenging and costly to develop. It adds insight into the design of self-discipline and tasks in teams which might help increase productivity.
Originality/value
This paper is related to the research on indefinite horizons, which attributes increases in cooperation to the existence of subgame perfect strategies to cooperate and potential gains from future cooperation. In comparison, this study examines the effects of the existence of subgame perfect strategies to work in isolation from the potential gains from future interactions. In addition, it examines whether their potential benefits depend on the cost of punishing when punishing is subgame perfect in a one-shot horizon.
期刊介绍:
This international journal contributes to the successful implementation and development of work teams and team-based organizations by providing a forum for sharing experience and learning to stimulate thought and transfer of ideas. It seeks to bridge the gap between research and practice by publishing articles where the claims are evidence-based and the conclusions have practical value. Effective teams form the heart of every successful organization. But team management is one of the hardest challenges faced by managers.