{"title":"Shock and Reconciliation? The Case of India–Pakistan, 1962–63","authors":"S. Mohan","doi":"10.1080/10402659.2023.2166785","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the interstate reconciliation between India and Pakistan after the shock of Sino-Indian War of 1962. The post-1962 war political-security equations, particularly at the regional level, gave rise to a situation that necessitated India’s reconciliatory negotiations with Pakistan over Kashmir. Though the rival parties engaged in a six-round political dialogue, the process ended up in a deadlock followed by spirals of armed clashes that culminated in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965. The paper shows that this reconciliation process proved counterproductive because it was imposed from outside and the principal parties, in a window-driven haste and under the political-strategic constraints, could not mutually agree on to reconcile their political differences and settle the territorial dispute over Kashmir.","PeriodicalId":51831,"journal":{"name":"Peace Review-A Journal of Social Justice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4000,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Peace Review-A Journal of Social Justice","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10402659.2023.2166785","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This paper examines the interstate reconciliation between India and Pakistan after the shock of Sino-Indian War of 1962. The post-1962 war political-security equations, particularly at the regional level, gave rise to a situation that necessitated India’s reconciliatory negotiations with Pakistan over Kashmir. Though the rival parties engaged in a six-round political dialogue, the process ended up in a deadlock followed by spirals of armed clashes that culminated in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965. The paper shows that this reconciliation process proved counterproductive because it was imposed from outside and the principal parties, in a window-driven haste and under the political-strategic constraints, could not mutually agree on to reconcile their political differences and settle the territorial dispute over Kashmir.