{"title":"On Anaphors Linked to Names Used Metaphorically","authors":"E. Corazza, Chris Genovesi","doi":"10.31577/ORGF.2021.28111","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In their 2018 paper “On the Metaphoric Use of (Fictional) Proper Names”, Corazza & Genovesi explored what speakers do when they utter a fictional name in a metaphorical way to refer to actual individuals. The example given was “Odysseus returned home” referring to their friend Bill, who had returned after a long and hectic journey. With such an example in mind, Corazza & Genovesi claimed that speakers produce a metaphorical utterance where properties of Odysseus are mapped onto the referent that the speaker intends so that they refer to that person. That is to say, the name “Odysseus” somewhat ceases to be a proper name, and instead becomes something akin to a Donnellan’s referential use of descriptions, i.e. a description that successfully picks out an object of discourse even if the latter does not satisfy the descriptive content conveyed by the description. In our example Bill does not satisfy the property of being called “Odysseus”. In this paper, we connect the previous work by Corazza & Genovesi’s with anaphora, in particular with the use of anaphoric definite descriptions linked to a metaphorical use of a proper name. With fictional proper names in mind, we are interested 254 Eros Corazza – Christopher Genovesi Organon F 28 (1) 2021: 253–268 in cases where speakers anaphorically refer to the actual referent. For example, we are interested in utterances of the sort “Odysseus returned home, he1 is hungry” or “Odysseus1 returned home, the/that brave soldier1 is hungry”, where “Odysseus” is metaphorically used to refer to the actual person, Bill, the individual the speaker has in mind. Such sentences leave us wondering how the anaphoric pronoun or description simultaneously carries the content from the fictional subject, and refers to Bill. On a cursory analysis, anaphora forces the properties attributed to the actual referent (e.g., Bill) into the background, like pragmatic presupposition. In the cases of anaphoric complex demonstratives and definite descriptions, the speaker emphasizes, or makes salient the further implications shared between the fictional character (e.g., Odysseus) and the actual referent (e.g., Bill; and that Bill, like Odysseus, had a harrowing journey).","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":"28 1","pages":"253-268"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3000,"publicationDate":"2021-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Organon F","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.31577/ORGF.2021.28111","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
In their 2018 paper “On the Metaphoric Use of (Fictional) Proper Names”, Corazza & Genovesi explored what speakers do when they utter a fictional name in a metaphorical way to refer to actual individuals. The example given was “Odysseus returned home” referring to their friend Bill, who had returned after a long and hectic journey. With such an example in mind, Corazza & Genovesi claimed that speakers produce a metaphorical utterance where properties of Odysseus are mapped onto the referent that the speaker intends so that they refer to that person. That is to say, the name “Odysseus” somewhat ceases to be a proper name, and instead becomes something akin to a Donnellan’s referential use of descriptions, i.e. a description that successfully picks out an object of discourse even if the latter does not satisfy the descriptive content conveyed by the description. In our example Bill does not satisfy the property of being called “Odysseus”. In this paper, we connect the previous work by Corazza & Genovesi’s with anaphora, in particular with the use of anaphoric definite descriptions linked to a metaphorical use of a proper name. With fictional proper names in mind, we are interested 254 Eros Corazza – Christopher Genovesi Organon F 28 (1) 2021: 253–268 in cases where speakers anaphorically refer to the actual referent. For example, we are interested in utterances of the sort “Odysseus returned home, he1 is hungry” or “Odysseus1 returned home, the/that brave soldier1 is hungry”, where “Odysseus” is metaphorically used to refer to the actual person, Bill, the individual the speaker has in mind. Such sentences leave us wondering how the anaphoric pronoun or description simultaneously carries the content from the fictional subject, and refers to Bill. On a cursory analysis, anaphora forces the properties attributed to the actual referent (e.g., Bill) into the background, like pragmatic presupposition. In the cases of anaphoric complex demonstratives and definite descriptions, the speaker emphasizes, or makes salient the further implications shared between the fictional character (e.g., Odysseus) and the actual referent (e.g., Bill; and that Bill, like Odysseus, had a harrowing journey).
Corazza和Genovesi在2018年的论文《论(虚构的)专有名词的隐喻性使用》中探讨了当说话者以隐喻的方式说出虚构的名字来指代实际的个人时,他们会做什么。举个例子是“奥德修斯回家了”,指的是他们的朋友比尔,他在经历了漫长而忙碌的旅程后回来了。考虑到这样一个例子,Corazza和Genovesi声称,说话者产生了一种隐喻性话语,奥德修斯的属性被映射到说话者想要的指称对象上,从而指称那个人。也就是说,“奥德修斯”这个名字在某种程度上不再是一个恰当的名字,而是变成了类似于唐纳兰对描述的指称性使用,即一种成功地挑选出话语对象的描述,即使后者不满足描述所传达的描述性内容。在我们的例子中,比尔不满足被称为“奥德修斯”的性质。在本文中,我们将Corazza和Genovesi的先前工作与回指联系起来,特别是与专有名称的隐喻使用相关的回指明确描述的使用。考虑到虚构的专有名称,我们感兴趣的是254 Eros Corazza–Christopher Genovesi Organon F 28(1)2021:253–268在说话者回指实际指称的情况下。例如,我们对“奥德修斯回家了,他饿了”或“奥德修斯回来了,勇敢的士兵饿了”之类的话语感兴趣,其中“奥德修斯”被比喻为实际的人,比尔,说话者心目中的那个人。这样的句子让我们想知道回指代词或描述是如何同时携带虚构主题的内容,并指代比尔的。粗略地分析,回指将实际被指对象(如Bill)的属性强行置于背景中,就像语用预设一样。在回指复杂指示词和明确描述的情况下,说话者强调或突出虚构人物(例如奥德修斯)和实际指代物(例如比尔;比尔和奥德修斯一样,经历了一段痛苦的旅程)之间的进一步含义。
期刊介绍:
Organon F publishes high-quality articles on the entire range of topics discussed in contemporary analytic philosophy. Accordingly, we invite authors to submit articles that address issues that belong, but are not limited, to philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, epistemology, metaphysics and philosophical logic. We also consider analytically written articles on ethics, aesthetics, social philosophy, political philosophy and history of philosophy. The principal aim is to publish original articles that meet the standards typical of analytic philosophy, primarily those of conceptual clarity, precision and soundness of argumentation.