A comment on arguments of mental model theory of causation

IF 1.2 4区 心理学 Q4 PSYCHOLOGY, EXPERIMENTAL
Pengfei Yin
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

ABSTRACT Causation is a complex concept. No single monistic theory of causation is likely to account for it (Wolff, P. (2014). Causal pluralism and force dynamics. In B. Copley, F. Martin, & N. Duffield (Eds.), Forces in grammatical structures: Causation between linguistics and philosophy). Nonetheless, mental model theory (MMT) claims to provide a unified account of causal representation and inference. In MMT, a singular causal claim “A caused B” has a deterministic meaning referring to three temporally ordered possibilities: A and B, not-A and B, not-A and not-B. No internal components such as mechanisms, powers, or dependencies are part of the core meaning of causal claims. It is argued that MMT’s attempts to refute counterexamples to its proposals are manifestly inadequate. Theoretically, the all-encompassing ambition of MMT make it so flexible as to be trivial. Technically, the term “modulation” is an unanalyzed and self-inconsistent concept. Moreover, in many situations, mental models are redundant for causal representation and inference. MMT’s monistic-deterministic view cannot capture the full complexity of causation.
因果关系心理模型理论的论证述评
摘要因果关系是一个复杂的概念。没有一个单一的因果关系一元论可能解释它(Wolff,P.(2014)。因果多元化和力量动态。B.Copley、F.Martin和N.Duffield(编辑),《语法结构中的力量:语言学和哲学之间的因果关系》。尽管如此,心理模型理论(MMT)声称提供了因果表征和推理的统一解释。在MMT中,“a导致B”的单一因果声明具有确定性含义,指的是三种时间顺序的可能性:a和B、非a和B,非a和非B。机制、权力或依赖性等内部组成部分都不是因果关系主张的核心含义的一部分。有人认为,MMT试图反驳其提案的反例显然是不够的。从理论上讲,MMT包罗万象的雄心使其变得如此灵活,以至于微不足道。从技术上讲,“调制”一词是一个未经分析且自相矛盾的概念。此外,在许多情况下,心理模型对于因果表征和推理是多余的。MMT的一元论确定性观点无法捕捉因果关系的全部复杂性。
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来源期刊
Journal of Cognitive Psychology
Journal of Cognitive Psychology PSYCHOLOGY, EXPERIMENTAL-
CiteScore
2.30
自引率
15.40%
发文量
54
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