{"title":"The Canadian Courts’ Approach to the ‘Duty to Consult’ Indigenous Peoples: A Comparative Overview","authors":"G. Barrie","doi":"10.25159/2522-3062/5307","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Articles 18, 19 and 23 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 2008 and Articles 6 and 15 of the ILO Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal People No 169 of 1989, generated a concept of the ‘duty to consult’ indigenous peoples in matters that adversely affect their interests. The question as to whether this ‘duty to consult’ had not developed into a rule of customary international law, was raised at the International Law Association’s meeting in Sofia in 2012. To answer this question a survey of state practice needs to be undertaken. This article focusses on the state practice of Canada regarding the ‘duty to consult’ as illustrated by decisions of that country’s courts. It can be implied that Canadian courts see the ‘duty to consult’ as an obligation which must be adhered to. Canadian courts have recognised the ‘duty to consult’ since the judgment in R v Sparrow in 1990, but the elaboration of the concept came strongly to the fore in a trilogy of cases in 2004 and 2005 in the Haida Nation, Taku River Tlingit First Nation and Mikisew Cree First Nation cases. Since then, the concept has been incisively discussed and applied in the Canadian Supreme Court in the Rio Tinto, Little Salmon, Moses and the Behn/Moulton Contracting cases from 2010 to 2013. The above developments are encapsulated in the 2017 Ontario Superior Court case of Saugeen First Nation. The example of Canadian courts accepting ‘the duty to consult’ its indigenous peoples has manifested itself in other jurisdictions, particularly in Australia and recently in South Africa; and indicates an evolving international customary law norm.","PeriodicalId":29899,"journal":{"name":"Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa-CILSA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1000,"publicationDate":"2021-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa-CILSA","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.25159/2522-3062/5307","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Articles 18, 19 and 23 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 2008 and Articles 6 and 15 of the ILO Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal People No 169 of 1989, generated a concept of the ‘duty to consult’ indigenous peoples in matters that adversely affect their interests. The question as to whether this ‘duty to consult’ had not developed into a rule of customary international law, was raised at the International Law Association’s meeting in Sofia in 2012. To answer this question a survey of state practice needs to be undertaken. This article focusses on the state practice of Canada regarding the ‘duty to consult’ as illustrated by decisions of that country’s courts. It can be implied that Canadian courts see the ‘duty to consult’ as an obligation which must be adhered to. Canadian courts have recognised the ‘duty to consult’ since the judgment in R v Sparrow in 1990, but the elaboration of the concept came strongly to the fore in a trilogy of cases in 2004 and 2005 in the Haida Nation, Taku River Tlingit First Nation and Mikisew Cree First Nation cases. Since then, the concept has been incisively discussed and applied in the Canadian Supreme Court in the Rio Tinto, Little Salmon, Moses and the Behn/Moulton Contracting cases from 2010 to 2013. The above developments are encapsulated in the 2017 Ontario Superior Court case of Saugeen First Nation. The example of Canadian courts accepting ‘the duty to consult’ its indigenous peoples has manifested itself in other jurisdictions, particularly in Australia and recently in South Africa; and indicates an evolving international customary law norm.
2008年《联合国土着人民权利宣言》第18、19和23条以及劳工组织1989年第169号《关于土著和部落人民的公约》第6和15条产生了一个概念,即在对土著人民利益产生不利影响的事项上“有义务咨询”土著人民。2012年在索非亚举行的国际法协会会议上提出了这一“协商义务”是否尚未发展成为习惯国际法规则的问题。为了回答这个问题,需要对国家实践进行调查。本文侧重于加拿大法院的裁决所表明的关于“协商义务”的国家实践。可以暗示的是,加拿大法院认为“协商义务”是一项必须遵守的义务。自1990年R v Sparrow案判决以来,加拿大法院就承认了“咨询义务”,但这一概念的阐述在2004年和2005年海达民族的三个案件中尤为突出,Taku River Tlingit第一民族和Mikisew Cree第一民族案例。自那以后,这一概念在加拿大最高法院2010年至2013年的力拓、小三文鱼、摩西和Behn/Moulton合同案中得到了深入的讨论和应用。上述事态发展在2017年安大略省高级法院对索根第一民族的案件中得到了概括。加拿大法院接受“与土著人民协商的义务”的例子在其他司法管辖区也有体现,特别是在澳大利亚和最近在南非;并表明国际习惯法规范正在演变。