Social Power and Non-cooperative Game Theory

IF 0.6 4区社会学 Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2022-02-21 DOI:10.1177/09516298221081810

William Bosworth,

引用次数: 0

Abstract

This paper defends the use of non-cooperative game theory for analysing questions of governance. To do so it posits a way of extending the resource account of social power from cooperative games to noncooperative games in a way that side steps a range of criticism. This involves identifying tipping points in the reputations of certain agents for paying and punishing those in their thrall. These tipping points are what give threats and offers their credibility in the absence of enforcement mechanisms and stabilise the distribution of social resources in society.

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社会权力与非合作博弈论

本文支持使用非合作博弈论来分析治理问题。为此，它提出了一种将社会权力的资源解释从合作游戏扩展到非合作游戏的方法，这种方法回避了一系列批评。这包括确定某些代理人的声誉转折点，因为他们付钱并惩罚那些受其奴役的人。在缺乏执行机制和稳定社会资源分配的情况下，这些引爆点会带来威胁，并提供可信度。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Journal of Theoretical Politics POLITICAL SCIENCE-

CiteScore

2.10

自引率

10.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Theoretical Politics is an international journal one of whose principal aims is to foster the development of theory in the study of political processes. It provides a forum for the publication of original papers seeking to make genuinely theoretical contributions to the study of politics. The journal includes rigorous analytical articles on a range of theoretical topics. In particular, it focuses on new theoretical work which is broadly accessible to social scientists and contributes to our understanding of political processes. It also includes original syntheses of recent theoretical developments in diverse fields.