The moderating role of institutional and credit constraints on the nexus between bribery and policy consistency

IF 3.3 3区经济学 Q1 DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

Journal of Economic Policy Reform Pub Date : 2023-03-15 DOI:10.1080/17487870.2023.2187391

H. Phạm, Leavitt Ha, Doan Ngoc Thang, Trung-Thanh To

引用次数: 0

Abstract

ABSTRACT This article is the first to examine whether bribery hurts or promotes policy consistency for firms confronting institutional and credit constraints by using World Bank Enterprise Surveys covering 104 developing countries from 2002 to 2006. By using the questionnaire that is only available in the 2002-2006 survey, policy consistency is measured by firms’ perception of the degree of consistency in officials’ interpretation of the law. Bribery reduces the consistency of policy implementation. The adverse impact of bribery on policy consistency is evident only in lower-income countries. Furthermore, these effects become more significant for firms facing institutional and credit constraints.

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制度和信贷约束对贿赂和政策一致性之间关系的调节作用

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来源期刊

Journal of Economic Policy Reform Multiple-

CiteScore

6.60

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Economic Policy Reform focuses on the analysis of economic policy reform. The journal draws upon what lessons can be learned from the successes and failures of countries undertaking reforms and how existing theories can be developed to shed light on positive as well as normative aspects of the reform process. The Journal of Economic Policy Reform encourages work from economists and political economy analysts on policies to promote growth and reduce poverty, intellectual property rights, aid versus trade, debt and debt relief, taxation and social security systems, surveys of key reform issues, as well as on corruption, democracy, emerging markets and the role of multilateral institutions.