Identity Metaphysics

IF 0.8 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
MONIST Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI:10.1093/monist/onaa022
G. Strawson
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

Identity metaphysics finds identity or unity where other metaphysical theories find difference or diversity. It denies the fundamentality of ontological distinctions that other theories treat as fundamental. It’s opposed to separatism, which mistakes natural conceptual distinctions for ground-floor ontological differences. It proposes that the distinctions between the concepts substance, object, quality, property, process, state, and event are metaphysically superficial; so too the distinctions between the concepts energy, lawsofnature, force, causation, power, and naturalnecessity. So too the distinction between these two sets of concepts. “Thinking takes apart what is really one” (Nietzsche 1885).
身份形而上
同一形而上学在其他形而上学理论发现差异或多样性的地方找到同一性或统一性。它否定了本体论区别的根本性,而其他理论将其视为根本性。它反对分离主义,分离主义将自然的概念差异误认为是底层的本体论差异。它提出,物质、对象、质量、性质、过程、状态和事件这四个概念之间的区别在形而上学上是肤浅的;能量、自然规律、力量、因果关系、力量和自然必然性之间的区别也是如此。这两组概念之间的区别也是如此。“思考把真正的东西拆开”(尼采1885)。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
MONIST
MONIST PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
1.90
自引率
11.10%
发文量
34
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