Resisting Resolution: Islamist Claims and Negotiations in Intrastate Armed Conflicts

Abstract

The prevalence of Islamist armed conflicts is an important problem of our time. One pivotal question that remains unexplored is whether conflicts fought over Islamist claims are more or less likely to be negotiated, and if so, why? This paper provides the first large-N study exploring the relationship between Islamist claims and negotiations in all intrastate armed conflicts for the time period 1975–2011. We argue that the transnational dimension can serve to make some Islamist conflicts resistant to peaceful resolution attempts. Our findings show that while conflicts over Islamist claims generally are no more likely to see negotiations, there is significant variation within this category. When we disaggregate Islamist conflicts, we find that transnational Islamist conflicts are less likely to experience negotiations, whereas conflicts fought over separatist or revolutionary Islamist claims are no more likely to see negotiations.